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Most of the many critics who denounce Citizens United v. 
FEC and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., ground their 
complaint in consequentialist terms, at least in part. They see 
these decisions as entrenching corporate power, by 
constitutional or quasi-constitutional means, against what 
ought to be a supervening public will. This Article argues for 
a different view. Far from entrenching corporate power, the 
rights cases effectively delegate choices about corporate 
activities to a politically sensitive, if surprising, instrument: 
ordinary state legislation. In particular, this Article advances 
two claims about the nature of states’ rights against corporate 
rights: first, under existing law, the states can subvert the 
federal rights of their own corporations; second, and more 
speculatively, the states can also frustrate the federal rights of 
foreign corporations that do local business. The analysis 
suggests that reformers would do well to look to the state 
capitols rather than the halls of Washington. It also yields 
implications for the theory of interstate corporate regulation 
more generally. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens United v. FEC1 
and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.2 sparked a wide-
ranging debate about the place of business corporations in 
the American economy and political scene. Dozens of articles 
attacking the decisions have populated the law reviews, to 
say nothing of the leading newspapers’ editorial pages.3 Even 
politicians have put the question of corporate rights center 
stage—President Obama’s critique of Citizens United, in his 
2010 State of the Union address, being only the most famous 
instance.4 In the academic as well as public presses, most 
 
1 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
2 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
3 For a catalog of some critical responses, see Kent Greenfield, In 
Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 309–12 (2015). 
4 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 
2010), in 156 CONG. REC. H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) (“With all due 
deference to the separation of powers, last week, the Supreme Court 
 
BUCCOLA – FINAL  
No. 3:595] STATES’ RIGHTS AGAINST CORPORATE RIGHTS 597 
 
critics’ judgment is based at least in part on the decisions’ 
supposed ill consequences. At bottom lies a perception that 
the cases entrench corporate power in domains where a 
sensible public judgment might opt to curtail it. 
Enough ink has been spilled on the merits of Citizens 
United and Hobby Lobby. Rather than revisit those decisions 
or the theoretical foundations of corporate rights more 
generally,5 this Article takes aim at common assumptions 
about the cases’ functional significance. The central 
contention of this Article is that consequentialist critics of 
federal corporate rights are wrong, ironically enough, to 
concentrate their attention on federal law.6 The practical 
meaning of the corporate-rights cases is less a function of the 
Constitution than of garden-variety state laws.7 More 
 
reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special 
interests—including foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our 
elections.”). 
5 For my defense of the decisions—and of the bulk of the Court’s 
historic corporate-rights cases, see Vincent S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights 
and Organizational Neutrality, 101 IOWA L. REV. 499 (2016). 
6 Notable exceptions are Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing 
Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639 (2016) (arguing that Citizens United 
and Hobby Lobby put pressure on state corporate law to ameliorate 
conflicts of interest within the firm); Greenfield, supra note 3, at 327–32 
(arguing that attention to governance rules would ameliorate concerns 
over corporate political influence); Joseph K. Leahy, Corporate Political 
Contributions as Bad Faith, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 477 (2015) (arguing that 
managers’ direction of corporate political contributions might constitute 
bad faith under state law); Joseph K. Leahy, Are Corporate Super PAC 
Contributions Waste or Self-Dealing? A Closer Look, 79 MO. L. REV. 283 
(2014) (arguing that corporate political contributions might constitute 
waste or self-dealing under state law); James Kwak, Corporate Law 
Constraints on Political Spending, 18 N.C. BANK. INST. J. 251 (2013) 
(arguing that courts should entertain derivative suits to restrain 
managerial political speech at odds with shareholder interest); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Speech: Who Decides?, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010) (arguing for political-speech specific voting rules 
to ensure expenditures are made to further shareholder interests). 
7 Hobby Lobby turned on the application of a statute—the Religious 
Freedom and Restoration Act—rather than the Constitution. Burwell v. 
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specifically, this Article advances two claims about the law of 
states’ rights against corporate rights—one claim weaker but 
more conclusive, one stronger but less certain. The weak 
claim says that the states can already enact ordinary 
legislation that would practically undermine their domestic 
corporations’ federal rights. The strong claim says that the 
states can also undermine the rights of foreign 
corporations—that is, corporations incorporated in other 
states—that do business within their borders. 
On its face, the notion of state preeminence in this 
domain might seem vulnerable to an elementary syllogism. 
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby concern the application of 
federal rights. Federal law trumps inconsistent state 
enactments. Therefore, an attempt by the states to 
countermand the Court looks doomed. Nevertheless, this 
Article will argue that the states in fact have much to say 
about federal corporate rights’ practical import, if not their 
formal existence. Implicit in the argument is a more general 
reminder of the states’ central role not only in regulating 
shareholder-manager relations, but also in defining the 
nature of the corporate form itself. 
The weak claim begins with an observation about the 
formal structure of the Court’s corporate-rights decisions. To 
understand these cases, one needs to distinguish between 
the related but distinctive concepts of corporate rights and 
corporate powers.8 When the Justices decide that a 
corporation, C, may resist a regulation on the ground of some 
federal right, they in effect decide two things in addition to 
the strength of the right itself: first, that the corporation is, 
 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). But in holding that 
for-profit corporations are capable of religious exercise, the Court 
implicitly concluded also that they may assert the right to free exercise 
under the First Amendment. 
8 Joe Leahy independently suggested a distinction along these lines in 
remarks made at the National Business Law Scholars Conference in 2015. 
See Joseph K. Leahy, The Ultra Vires Solution to Citizens United, 
presentation slides available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802147 
[https://perma.cc/W7BR-2TZW]. 
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as a general matter, a kind of entity capable of bearing the 
right; and, second, that C in particular has been constituted 
with the power to do whatever it is the right immunizes. The 
first holding, about corporate rights, has by its nature a 
broad application because it concerns the fit between the 
right and the corporate form generally. The second holding, 
about C’s powers, is necessarily limited in application 
because it depends on localized facts about C. Yet both are 
necessary to C’s assertion that it may act in its preferred 
manner notwithstanding contrary law. Put generally, a 
corporation can thwart regulation if and only if it has both 
the power to act contrary to the regulation and the right to 
do so. 
The states cannot overrule the Court’s understanding of 
corporate rights. That much is clear. What they can do, 
however, is disempower the corporations they create from 
doing the kinds of things that implicate disfavored federal 
rights. An axiom of corporate law holds that the corporation’s 
powers derive from its articles of incorporation—in most 
cases a matter of state law.9 The states thus can effectively 
cabin the consequences of federal rights precisely because 
declining to grant a power to do some act is importantly 
different from invading a person’s right to do an act it is 
empowered to do. 
To make the intuition concrete, consider a trivial yet 
telling example. Under Delaware law, no domestic 
corporation organized after April 18, 1945 has the power to 
issue “honorary degrees” unless the Secretary of Education 
specially endorses its articles of incorporation.10 It is at least 
arguable—and for present purposes we may assume—that 
 
9 See Pollman, supra note 6, at 644–54 (describing the emergence of 
corporate law as a matter primarily of state concern). Some federally 
chartered corporations are disproportionately significant to the national 
economy. But they are relatively few in number outside the banking 
industry. See Paul E. Lund, Federally Chartered Corporations and Federal 
Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 317, 320–25 (2009). 
10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 125 (West 2011). 
BUCCOLA – FINAL  
600 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
the mark of approval implied in conferring an honorary 
certificate is speech protected by the First Amendment. If, 
for example, a scion of the du Pont family wished to confer a 
(richly deserved) honor on Wilmington native Judge 
Reinhold, it is doubtful the state could stop her. But not so 
where E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company, Inc. seeks to do 
likewise. The corporation may do only what its creator—
Delaware, in this case—vests it with power to do. It violates 
no constitutional rule to create “bodies politic,” as 
corporations were once known,11 incapable of granting 
honorary degrees. Thus, although the First Amendment 
protects speech the corporation is empowered to make, it has 
nothing to say about speech that is ultra vires. 
If the rights-powers distinction strikes the modern ear as 
too clever by half, it is for two reasons. First, lawyers are 
accustomed to thinking about the rights of natural persons. 
Most rights cases—certainly most constitutional rights 
cases—concern an individual’s authority to block 
government regulation. The government seeks to prevent a 
person from doing something she wishes to do, and she 
resists. There is no question of her power to act contrary to 
the regulation. Unlike natural persons, however, 
corporations are products of law. Positive law defines the 
corporation by establishing its capacities to be and to do. 
Second, corporations today are in fact typically endowed with 
very broad powers. In exchange for a small fee and some 
rudimentary documentation, all fifty states will create a 
corporation competent to pursue “all lawful acts and 
activities.”12 It was not always so. During the republic’s first 
century, charters were hard to come by, and they tended to 
 
11 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *467; 1 STEWART KYD, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 12 (1793). 
12 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (West 2011). The precise 
formulation varies. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2010) (ascribing to the corporation the purpose of conducting “any lawful 
business”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (granting 
the corporation “the same powers as an individual to do all things 
necessary and convenient” to its purpose). 
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circumscribe quite narrowly both the means and ends of 
corporate activity. Those days have passed, but as long as 
the states’ prerogative remains, the distinction between 
corporate rights and powers will be vital. 
The strong claim takes as given a corporation whose 
articles empower it to do acts protected by a federal right. If 
such a corporation does business wholly within its state of 
incorporation, this is the end of the story. But the question 
remains what, if anything, other states in which the 
corporation seeks to operate may do to restrain its exercise of 
disfavored powers. It is clear these “host” states lack the 
authority to abrogate charters or the Constitution.13 But host 
states might nevertheless adopt two kinds of strategies by 
which they could practically restrain the exercise of 
disfavored corporate rights. Neither strategy targets the 
formal existence of powers. Instead, they would seek to 
influence corporate decision-making. Both approaches would 
provoke criticism, and the courts have doctrines at their 
disposal that could, if extended plausibly, nullify both. But 
for reasons of political economy to be discussed, host states 
are in a much stronger position than many would suppose. 
The first strategy challenges the internal-affairs doctrine. 
Ordinarily, the mode of corporate decision-making is 
supposed to be the chartering state’s province.14 Indeed, the 
federal structure generated by the internal-affairs doctrine 
has been called, plausibly, “the genius of American corporate 
law.”15 But fundamentally it is a choice-of-law rule and, 
many think, only a customary one.16 Some states already 
 
13 This Article uses the phrase “chartering state” to describe a firm’s 
state of incorporation, and “host state” to describe a state seeking to 
regulate a corporation chartered elsewhere. 
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 1971)  
15 ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1–13 
(1993). 
16 See infra Section IV.A. 
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reject it in part.17 They may wish to weaken it further. An 
aggressive intervention of this sort could make foreign 
corporations’ exercise of a federal right practically, although 
not formally, impossible. For example, a legislature wishing 
to undermine Citizens United might declare the directors of 
any corporation doing business domestically liable to the 
corporation’s shareholders for making political contributions 
absent their unanimous approval. Less extreme laws are of 
course possible. 
The second strategy conditions the state’s recognition of 
foreign corporations on their abstaining from exercising a 
right. Similar laws have deep roots in American law. Until 
late in the nineteenth century, it was commonly understood 
that the states could refuse to recognize the existence of 
foreign corporations for reasons good, bad, or nonexistent,18 
and it followed that they could condition recognition on any 
basis they wished.19 The states’ authority today is no longer 
plenary, as it once was. Although courts have never 
abrogated the non-recognition power in general terms, they 
have chipped away at some of its applications.20 As one 
commentator puts it, “modern juridical thinking has cut 
deeply into the acceptability of the principle of conditional 
entry.”21 A state can still decline to recognize foreign 
corporations, but not for reasons that are themselves 
unconstitutional. In addition, some strands of constitutional 
doctrine can be read to prohibit a state’s undermining of 
foreign corporations’ rights. But the cases invalidating 
conditional-recognition laws have typically concerned state 
policies discriminating against out-of-state business. If a 
state disempowered its own domestic corporations with 
 
17 See infra notes 102–06 and accompanying text. 
18 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839); see infra 
notes 139–45 and accompanying text. 
19 See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (7 Wall.) 168 (1869); infra Section 
IV.B. 
20 See infra Section IV.B. 
21 William Laurens Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: A Current 
Account, 47 N.C. L. REV. 733, 733 (1969). 
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respect to a particular activity, the state may well be within 
the Constitution’s bounds to demand that foreign 
corporations play on a level field. 
Although this Article focuses on the states’ authority to 
curtail federally recognized rights, the analysis has broader 
implications for the law of corporate regulation. The central 
theoretical dilemma concerns not the nature of political 
rights in particular, but, more generally, the allocation of 
regulatory authority in a federal system. In this vein there 
are two fundamental questions. First—in which domains 
should state policy supplant the results of voluntary 
association under competitive conditions? And second—
which state or states ought to supply the terms on which 
firms will compete? Thus, many of this Article’s findings can 
be generalized to other, perennially vexing issues of 
corporate law in a national economy, including, for example, 
the extent of limited liability, the definition of agency, and 
the nature and direction of fiduciary duties. 
What follows is organized in three parts. Part II discusses 
the theory and history of state authority over domestic 
corporations’ powers, arguing that an absolute authority to 
undermine the significance of federal rights persists to 
today. Parts III and IV turn to the states’ putative authority 
to regulate foreign corporations’ use of chartered powers. 
Part III considers the political economy arguments for and 
against such authority. Part IV describes and evaluates the 
relevant legal doctrines. It argues that, notwithstanding 
apparent doctrinal ambiguity, the courts have in general 
condemned only those host-state interventions that reflect a 
discriminatory policy. This finding reflects the political 
economy story tolerably well, and suggests that economically 
important states could influence the significance of federal 
corporate rights more profoundly than has been supposed. 
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II. THE STATES AND DOMESTIC CORPORATION 
POWERS 
This Part argues that the states can, if they wish, decline 
to give their own corporations the power to act in ways 
modern constitutional law seems to protect. The claim is 
grounded in a theory of the corporation that dates to, and 
before, the nation’s founding. The facts are well known to 
corporate scholars, but their significance in the 
constitutional context seems to have gone largely 
unrecognized. In the early-American imagination, the states 
were understood to have broad authority to regulate the 
capacities of the corporations they created, and they 
routinely used the authority. By the early twentieth century, 
the states more or less ceased to restrict corporate powers, as 
such, but they did so as a matter of political expediency 
rather than legal compulsion. No doctrine in the 
development of modern corporate law suggests that the 
states surrendered their constitutional authority over 
domestic corporations’ powers. 
A. The Traditional Legal Theory of Corporate Powers 
To a nineteenth-century American lawyer, the proposition 
that a corporation has any inherent powers to act, 
irrespective of the terms of its charter, would have been 
astounding. The nature of the relationship between a state 
and the corporations it constituted was well settled, and it 
was the relationship between creator and created.22 
Individuals, including those associated in partnership, were 
entitled to do whatever acts government did not or, in virtue 
of its limited sphere, could not prohibit. A corporation, by 
contrast, could invoke rights against government 
 
22 In Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 
(1819), the Supreme Court famously held that the contracts clause 
prohibits states from altering a charter’s terms once granted. The 
decision’s practical effect was, however, short-lived. The states began 
reserving the option to revise terms.  
BUCCOLA – FINAL  
No. 3:595] STATES’ RIGHTS AGAINST CORPORATE RIGHTS 605 
 
intervention only insofar as its charter licensed the activity 
at issue. 
Early decisions of the Supreme Court consistently 
announced this common understanding. In an 1804 
insurance dispute, for example, Chief Justice Marshall 
explained that the corporation derives its powers, its very 
nature, so to speak, from positive legislation: 
[T]his body . . . in its corporate capacity, is the mere 
creature of the act to which it owes its existence, . . . 
[and] it may correctly be said to be precisely what the 
incorporating act has made it, to derive all its powers 
from that act, and to be capable of exerting its 
faculties only in the manner which that act 
authorizes.23  
Fifteen years later, in the Dartmouth College Case, Marshall 
reprised the theme. “Being a mere creature of law,” he wrote, 
the corporation “possesses only those properties which the 
charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as 
incidental to its very existence.”24 This understanding was 
not peculiar to the Marshall Court. Marshall’s successor, 
Chief Justice Taney, repeatedly set out the same view. 
“[C]orporations created by statute must depend,” he 
explained, “both for their powers, and the mode of exercising 
them, upon the true construction of the [charter] statute 
itself.”25 In his view, it “will not be denied” that “a 
corporation is strictly limited to the exercise of those powers 
which are specifically conferred on it.”26 
With this last remark Taney perhaps spoke 
hyperbolically. The law of corporate powers was somewhat 
more complicated. Not all powers had to be “specifically 
 
23 Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127, 167 
(1804). 
24 Trs. of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636. 
25 Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 68 
(1827). 
26 Charles Rivers Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 546 
(1837). 
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conferred” by charter. Some were implied. Chancellor Kent 
identified six such “ordinary” powers: perpetual succession, 
amotion, the power to sue and be sued, the power to hold 
property, the power to act under a common seal, and the 
power to make bylaws for internal governance.27 These 
ordinary powers were to be inferred from silence; they were 
not, however, beyond the chartering state’s authority to 
curtail. In fact, as a matter of practice, the ordinary powers 
were “taken, in many instances, with much modification and 
restriction.”28 For example, although corporations were 
presumed to exist perpetually, most were in fact chartered 
for a limited term of years.29 In addition, although 
corporations were presumed to be able to hold property of all 
kinds, they were frequently deprived of their “common-law 
right, of purchasing or receiving lands or other property.”30 
Apart from the ordinary or “incidental” attributes of 
incorporation, all powers had to be spelled out in the charter. 
A leading nineteenth-century treatise on corporate law 
explained the general rule of charter construction in terms 
similar to those governing Congress’s grants of power under 
the Constitution. According to Angell and Ames, “a 
corporation has no other powers than such as are specifically 
granted; or, such as are necessary for the purpose of carrying 
into effect the powers expressly granted.”31 Grants of power 
 
27 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *277–78 (1889 
rev’d ed.). These were sometimes referred to as the corporation’s 
“incidental” powers. See, e.g., JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE § 110, at 84 
(7th ed. 1861).  
28 2 KENT, supra note 27, at *278; see ANGELL & AMES, supra note 27, 
§§ 110–11, at 83–84. 
29 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 554–64 (1933) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting in part) (noting that until the late-nineteenth century, most 
corporations were chartered to last twenty, thirty, or fifty years); 2 KENT, 
supra note 27, at *267–68 (“[M]ost of the private corporations recently 
created by statute are limited in duration to a few years.”). 
30 ANGELL & AMES, supra note 27, § 151, at 114. 
31 ANGELL & AMES, supra note 27, § 111, at 85; see also 2 KENT, supra 
note 27, at *298–99.  
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were often construed narrowly.32 Chancellor Kent reasoned 
that corporations, “mere creatures of law, established for 
special purposes,” who derive “all their powers from the acts 
creating them,” should have to justify the business they 
sought to do in terms of the charter “and be confined in their 
operations to the mode, and manner, and subject matter 
prescribed.”33 Angell and Ames likewise explained the 
governing norm in terms of the corporation’s ontological 
foundations. The corporation, “having been created for a 
specific purpose, not only can make no contract forbidden by 
its charter, which is, as it were the law of its nature, but in 
general can make no contract which is not necessary, either 
directly or incidentally, to enable it to answer that 
purpose.”34 Each corporation’s charter was like a custom-
built moat. Inside it, entrepreneurial activity in the 
corporate name could flourish; outside it, there simply was 
no corporation. 
Two remedial schemes policed the moat. One was the 
information in the nature of quo warranto, by which an 
attorney general could oust a corporation from business 
exceeding its charter or cause the forfeit of its franchise 
altogether. The other, more important, remedy lay in the 
doctrine of ultra vires, which holds void, and hence 
unenforceable, a corporation’s colorable agreement to do acts 
beyond its chartered powers.35 “In its proper sense,” one 
 
32 See, e.g., Charles Rivers Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 
420 (1837); Beaty v. Lessee of Knowler, 20 U.S (4 Pet.) 152, 168 (1830) 
(“That a corporation is strictly limited to the exercise of those powers 
which are specifically conferred on it, will not be denied. The exercise of 
the corporate franchise, being restrictive of individual rights, cannot be 
extended beyond the letter and spirit of the act of incorporation.”). 
33 2 KENT, supra note 27, at *299. 
34 ANGELL & AMES, supra note 27, § 256, at 228. 
35 Pollman, supra note 6, at 648–49; Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas 
Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens 
United with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 880–81 
(2016). See generally Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder 
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treatise explains, the ultra vires act “denotes some act or 
transaction on the part of a corporation which, although not 
unlawful or contrary to public policy if done or executed by 
an individual, is yet beyond the legitimate powers of the 
corporation as they are defined” by the law creating it.36 
Ultra vires harnesses market forces in an ingenious way to 
constrain corporate managers where active state monitoring 
might be exceedingly expensive. But the doctrine also follows 
deductively from the theory of the corporation. The 
corporation is just what the state has made—no more or less. 
By its nature, therefore, it can do only those things the state 
has allowed. Whatever else management might pretend to do 
in the corporation’s name cannot, in fact, be a corporate act, 
but only the act of individuals masquerading as a 
collectivity.37 
Ultra vires decisions fill the nineteenth-century corporate 
law treatises. The 1891 case of Central Transportation Co. v. 
Pullman’s Palace Car Co. is but one example of the many 
decisions reflecting the charter’s supremacy.38 In 1862, 
Pennsylvania had created the Central Transportation 
Company, providing in its charter that its objective was “the 
transportation of passengers in railroad cars constructed and 
to be owned by the said company” under certain patents.39 
Eight years later, the commonwealth empowered Central 
also “to enter into contracts with corporations of 
[Pennsylvania] or any other state for the leasing or hiring 
and transfer to them, or any of them,” of its “railway cars 
and other personal property.”40 At stake in the case was the 
 
Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with Notes on How Corporate Law Could 
Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279 (2001).  
36 2 ARTHUR W. MACHEN, JR., A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS WITH REFERENCE TO FORMATION AND OPERATION UNDER 
GENERAL LAWS § 1012 (1909). 
37 See generally Albert J. Harno, Privileges and Powers of a 
Corporation and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires, 35 YALE L.J. 13 (1925). 
38 139 U.S. 24 (1891). 
39 Id. at 50. 
40 Id. 
BUCCOLA – FINAL  
No. 3:595] STATES’ RIGHTS AGAINST CORPORATE RIGHTS 609 
 
validity of a contract under which Central would lease all of 
its business to Pullman for 99 years. The Court held the deal 
invalid. In the Justices’ eyes, the “lease” was a ruse by which 
Central sought to alienate its franchises entirely, an end its 
charter did not contemplate.41 If Central had been a 
partnership, there is no doubt it would have had a liberty of 
contract to dispose of its property as it saw fit—and likewise 
if Central’s actual charter had been understood to allow the 
sale of its business. But it was not a partnership, and the 
charter was not so understood. The Court saw only a 
straightforward application of an unchallenged premise: 
“The powers of corporations organized under legislative 
statutes are such, and such only, as those statutes confer.”42 
B. The Modern Politics of Corporate Powers 
The judicial doctrine of plenary state authority over 
domestic corporations’ powers was not just a speculative 
deduction. The states actively and regularly restricted 
corporate prerogatives through the republic’s first century.43 
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, general 
incorporation statutes were rare. The creation of each new 
corporation entailed a unique legislative act, and legislatures 
took the opportunity to circumscribe the means as well as 
the ends of corporate activities.44 This habit of restricting 
corporate powers was likely a function of the widespread use 
of franchises. To induce investment in naturally monopolistic 
enterprises, legislatures regularly granted monopoly 
privileges. A legislature hoping to develop the infrastructure 
of trade might, for example, create a corporation with 
exclusive authority to build a toll road between points A and 
 
41 Id. at 53. 
42 Id. at 43 (quoting Thomas v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 71, 82 (1879)). 
43 See Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General 
Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 258 (1976). 
44 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships, Corporations, and the Theory 
of the Firm, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 66, 66 (1998). 
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B. To ensure the monopoly did not exceed the bounds in 
which it could be justified, the corporation’s sphere of 
activity had to be limited. But whatever legislators’ true 
motivations might have been, the charters they issued in fact 
tended to be exceptionally narrow by modern standards. The 
turnpike corporation’s charter would often do more than 
restrict the firm’s activities to those necessary to road 
building; it might, for example, specify the highway’s precise 
route.45 
In time, the importance of state preeminence over the 
powers of domestic corporations waned. The states never lost 
their plenary authority, whether through constitutional 
change or federal statute; they simply ceased to exercise it.46 
 
45 Ronald E. Seavoy, The Public Service Origins of the American 
Business Corporation, 52 BUS. HIST. REV. 30, 46 (1978). 
46 The broad outline of this history was a focal point of Justice 
Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 426–28 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Critics of the decision likewise cite the history as 
evidence of the decision’s supposed non-originalism. See, e.g., Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in Eroding “We the 
People’s” Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 26) (on file with author) (“The 
Court’s analysis in Citizens United is at odds with traditional corporate 
legal theory on a variety of dimensions.”); Strine & Walter, supra note 35, 
at 882 (“Because Citizens United takes a view at odds both with the 
historical understanding of business corporations’ legal subordination to 
the decisions made by elected legislators and the lengthy history of federal 
and state legislation restricting the involvement of for-profit corporations 
in the political process, it can be fairly be described as more ‘original’ than 
originalist.”); John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First 
Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 
225 (2015) (arguing that historical regulation of speech activities by the 
states should “lead committed originalists to reject First Amendment 
rights for corporate speech”); Joseph F. Morissey, A Contractarian Critique 
of Citizens United, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 765, 780–84 (2013); cf. Geoffrey 
R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 485, 497. This line of criticism confuses sovereigns. Citizens United 
concerned the validity of a federal regulation’s application to a Virginia 
non-stock corporation constituted by the Commonwealth to be capable of 
doing any lawful act with powers equal to those of an individual. See VA. 
CODE Ann. §§ 13.1–825, 826 (2011). The founding-era practice of a 
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The historical reasons for this important change are 
contested, but the change itself is not. What is certain is that 
liberal access to the corporate form, which is so familiar 
today, is the product of state legislative choice in a period of 
rapid industrial expansion, not of judicial reconsideration of 
the theory of the firm. 
Two related developments are of particular importance 
for our purposes. The first was the growth of general 
incorporation statutes. As the industrial age dawned, 
entrepreneurs’ ability to aggregate capital became 
increasingly important. Legislatures found themselves doing 
little more than considering charter applications. Not that 
most legislators found this a burden: the issuance of 
corporate charters had become a primary locus of regulatory 
rent-seeking. Adherents to a Jacksonian populism, already 
predisposed to distrust concentrated wealth, agitated in 
particular against the legislatures’ practice of picking and 
choosing the winners of industrial development. Their 
answer was not, however, the corporation’s abolition, but its 
democratization.47 By the 1870s, most states had enacted a 
general incorporation statute to make the corporate form 
widely available.48 
The same forces that pushed to liberalize access to the 
corporate form simultaneously conspired to broaden the uses 
to which the form could be put. The connection between 
liberal access and scope was not strictly necessary. It would 
have been possible to make incorporation freely available, 
 
sovereign’s limiting its own corporations’ powers would have been relevant 
to an originalist investigation of Virginia’s authority to restrict corporate 
political speech. It says nothing about the validity of a federal law 
abridging the speech of corporations actually constituted with authority to 
speak. 
47 See Seligman, supra note 43, at 257–58 (describing the minimal 
preconditions to a charter under the general incorporation acts). 
48 Lamoreaux, supra note 44, at 66; see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937 (1991). Delaware enacted its 
first general incorporation statute in 1875. Seligman, supra note 43, at 
249–50. 
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but to limit the corporation’s ambit to select industries, with 
significant restrictions on conduct. Indeed, many states 
experimented with regimes of this sort, at least for a time.49 
But in a general sense, the liberal impulse toward general 
incorporation was inherently at odds with a world in which 
legislatures set tight bounds on corporate activity. The 
corporation, as a means of aggregating capital cheaply, was 
becoming increasingly central to the economy.50 Perpetual 
existence was established as a norm, and limitations on 
capital stock were abolished. The corporation came to have, 
as near as possible, all of the powers of an unincorporated 
association of entrepreneurs—a partnership. The trend 
toward broader corporate powers found its logical conclusion 
in 1888, when New Jersey allowed corporations chartered 
there to own stock freely, thereby allowing entrepreneurs to 
replicate the trust in substance if not form.51 Josiah Marvel, 
the Wilmington attorney who drafted Delaware’s ambitious 
1899 general corporation act, summarized the law’s 
distinctive features in a single sentence. The act, he wrote in 
an advertisement to potential promoters, “furnishes at least 
expense, ample right to stockholders, and reduces 
restrictions upon corporate action to a minimum.”52 
 
49 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 554–55 (1933) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting in part) (“At first, corporations could be formed under the 
general laws only for a limited number of purposes—usually those which 
required a relatively large fixed capital, like transportation, banking, and 
insurance, and mechanical, mining, and manufacturing enterprises.”). 
50 See Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional 
Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 
129, 138–61 (1985) (arguing that developments in the technologies of 
communication and transportation, which increased the amount of 
interstate commerce in absolute terms and as a share of total trade, 
pushed state legislatures toward general incorporation statutes granting 
broad corporate privileges). 
51 Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race: Competition for Corporate 
Charters and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910, 32 J. CORP. 
L. 323, 335–45 (2007); Seligman, supra note 43, at 265–70. 
52 Seligman, supra note 43, at 271. Nascent competition among the 
states, so evident in Marvel’s advertisements, ensured that no state could 
long resist liberalizing its corporation laws. Not all were pleased with the 
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By 1912, forty-two states permitted the organization of 
corporations for “any lawful purpose.”53 The modern regime 
was in place. Today, in exchange for a small fee, all fifty 
states will create a corporation empowered to pursue more or 
less all lawful purposes and do more or less all lawful acts.54 
For present purposes, one need not decide whether the 
modern legislation marks a salutary development. What is 
important to see in this familiar story is the fundamentally 
political rather than constitutional nature of the change. 
Without this understanding, one cannot properly understand 
the scope of the holding in a case like Hobby Lobby, and in 
particular the way in which such a case preserves state 
authority. In Hobby Lobby, the Court considered whether 
three firms—Hobby Lobby Stores, Mardel, and Conestoga 
Wood—could be excused on religious grounds from 
complying with an otherwise valid regulation promulgated 
by the Department of Health and Human Services. As one 
might expect, the greater share of the opinions dealt with a 
difficult question of federal right—whether corporations can 
 
dynamic. See, e.g., Lee, 288 U.S. at 555–60 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(describing and lamenting the competitive pressures that caused many 
legislatures to liberalize their corporation laws). 
53 Seligman, supra note 43, at 269. Among other things, liberalization 
of corporate powers and purposes spelled the effective end of ultra vires. 
For an argument that the doctrine could be revitalized, if in a reduced 
form, see Greenfield, supra note 35. 
54 E.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 121(a) (West 2011) (“In addition to 
the powers enumerated in § 122 of this title, every corporation, its officers, 
directors and stockholders shall possess and may exercise all the powers 
and privileges granted by this chapter or by any other law or by its 
certificate of incorporation, together with any powers incidental thereto, so 
far as such powers and privileges are necessary or convenient to the 
conduct, promotion or attainment of the business or purposes set forth in 
its certificate of incorporation.”); id. § 102(a)(3) (permitting a corporation 
to state “that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act 
or activity for which corporations may be organized under the General 
Corporation Law of Delaware, and by such statement all lawful acts and 
activities shall be within the purposes of the corporation, except for 
express limitations, if any.”). 
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bear a right of religious free exercise under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act  (“RFRA”). The Court answered 
yes.55 But, consistent with the history sketched above, the 
Justices also saw that federal law alone could not dispose of 
the case. The question of whether the companies had the 
power to exercise whatever religious rights the RFRA might 
protect was critical to the judgment in the case, if not the 
decision’s precedential significance. The Justices answered 
that the companies had the power to exercise these religious 
rights: 
[T]he objectives that may properly be pursued by the 
companies in these cases are governed by the laws of 
the States in which they were incorporated—
Pennsylvania and Oklahoma—and the laws of those 
States permit for-profit corporations to pursue “any 
lawful purpose” or “act,” including the pursuit of 
profit in conformity with the owners’ religious 
principles.56 
Had state law not invested the companies with such 
broad powers, the very question of the RFRA’s application to 
corporations, generally, would have been mere digression. 
 
55 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–69 
(2014). 
56 Id. at 2771–72 (2014) (citing 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301 (2001) 
(“Corporations may be incorporated under this subpart for any lawful 
purpose or purposes”)); see OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 1002, 1005 (West 2012) 
(“[E]very corporation, whether profit or not for profit” may “be 
incorporated or organized . . . to conduct or promote any lawful business or 
purposes”). Among other things, this passage suggests that Hobby Lobby 
was not about unconstitutional conditions. Cf. Kent Greenfield, Hobby 
Lobby Symposium: Hobby Lobby, “Unconstitutional Conditions,” and 
Corporate Law Mistakes, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 4, 2016, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/hobby-lobby-symposium-hobby-lobby-
unconstitutional-conditions-and-corporate-law-mistakes 
[https://perma.cc/3LTE-FAXP]. If it were, then the powers with which 
Pennsylvania and Oklahoma actually chose to vest the respondents would 
have been irrelevant. Indeed, Hobby Lobby is not about state corporate 
law at all (apart from the quoted sentence). It is about the existence of a 
federal right on which corporations may stand if they are so constituted. 
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C. Does the Doctrine of Incorporation Limit State 
Authority? 
The skeptic can be forgiven for raising an eyebrow at all 
of this history. Much in the constitutional landscape has 
changed since the states began freely chartering corporations 
with the power to do all lawful acts. Most important, for our 
purposes, has been the judicial discovery of the doctrine of 
selective incorporation. Over the course of eighty-five years, 
beginning in 1925, the Supreme Court has held that most of 
the restrictions on federal authority found in the Bill of 
Rights apply with equal force against the states.57 It is all 
well and good, one might think, to say states had free rein 
before the Bill of Rights constrained them. But does it follow 
that the states’ prerogative would survive judicial scrutiny 
today? 
This is a serious objection. Indeed, two modern cases, 
both invalidating state restrictions on corporate political 
spending, seem to imply that not all is as this Article has 
claimed. The first case, First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti,58 concerned a 1975 Massachusetts law prohibiting 
business corporations from making contributions or 
expenditures “for the purpose of . . . influencing or affecting 
the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than 
one materially affecting any of the property, business or 
assets of the corporation.”59 A referendum slated for the 
following year would have amended the Commonwealth’s 
constitution to authorize a graduated income tax, and the 
legislature worried that corporate advertising might defeat 
it.60 Five corporations—two nationally chartered banks and 
 
57 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding that the 
states may not infringe the freedom of speech). For the Court’s latest 
thoughts on incorporation, see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 
(2010). 
58 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
59 Id. at 767–68 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 55, § 8 (West 1977)). 
60 The statute specified that “[n]o question submitted to the voters 
solely concerning the taxation of the income, property or transactions of 
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three domestic business corporations—challenged the law, 
and the Supreme Court ultimately held it invalid. 
The Montana statute at issue in the second case, 
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, had a broader 
compass and served evidently different purposes.61 The law 
generally prohibited corporations from making contributions 
or expenditures “in connection with” candidates, political 
committees supporting a candidate, or political parties.62 It 
made an exception, however, for expenditures made from a 
segregated fund consisting solely of voluntary 
contributions.63 In this sense, the Montana law, unlike the 
Massachusetts statute at issue in Bellotti, seems to have 
been calibrated to ameliorate agency problems within the 
firm, rather than to silence corporate interests as such. 
Nevertheless, the Justices, in a one-page opinion per curiam, 
held the law to be an unconstitutional abridgement of the 
corporations’ first amendment rights.64 Two sentences 
sufficed to explain the majority’s judgment: “The question 
presented in this case is whether the holding of Citizens 
United applies to the Montana state law. There can be no 
serious doubt that it does.”65 
Superficially, at least, Bellotti and American Tradition 
Partnership seem to imply that the states, whatever their 
historical authority over domestic corporations, may no 
longer create entities incapable of exercising federal rights. 
After all, if the states could make their corporations 
incapable of speech, then the cases should have come out 
differently—at least with respect to domestic corporations. 
 
individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or 
assets of the corporation.” Id. Justice Powell’s opinion noted the obvious: 
the law was “tailor-made” to influence the outcome of one particular 
referendum. Id. at 793. 
61 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012). 
62 Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2011)). 
63 MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(4) (2011). 
64 Bullock, 132 S. Ct. at 2491. 
65 Id. 
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Yet such a broad reading of the decisions would be 
misplaced. At least two alternative interpretations are 
plausible and do not depend on an inference that the Court 
up-ended two centuries of settled doctrine without a word of 
explanation. On one reading, the decisions represent the 
Justices’ considered view of state authority over domestic 
corporations, but only with regard to speech. The evidence 
for this view derives not from the logic of rights and powers, 
as a general matter, but from the Court’s longstanding 
partiality toward speech as the first right among equals and, 
more specifically, from the muddled concept of listeners’ 
rights.66 If it is the hypothetical audience whose interest 
counts most, then no great leap is needed to declare that the 
state-corporation relationship is beside the point when 
speech is at stake. Bellotti itself suggests a rationale along 
these lines, framing the decisive issue as a question about 
the marketplace of ideas rather than a coherent theory of the 
firm: 
The court below framed the principal question in this 
case as whether and to what extent corporations 
have First Amendment rights. We believe that the 
court posed the wrong question. The Constitution 
often protects interests broader than those of the 
party seeking their vindication. The First 
Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal 
interests. The proper question therefore is not 
whether corporations “have” First Amendment rights 
and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of 
natural persons. Instead, the question must be 
whether [the Massachusetts law] abridges expression 
that the First Amendment was meant to protect.67 
Despite its plausibility, however, a speech-specific 
interpretation of Bellotti and American Tradition 
 
66 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390–91 (1969) 
(identifying the rights of listeners and viewers as paramount concern in 
license adjudication). 
67 435 U.S. 765, 775–76 (1978). 
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Partnership is unsatisfying because it lacks a limiting formal 
principle. Many legal rules benefit persons other than those 
whom they nominally protect. Basic property rights 
illustrate the idea. Rights to exclude, to alienate, and to 
improve nominally belong only to the owner of an asset. But 
property rights to the asset redound to the benefit of the 
“audience” too, in the sense that they induce owners to invest 
in capital in ways consumers are apt to approve. In some 
sense, it is fair to say that property rights exist not for the 
good of the nominal beneficiary, but for the “public interest.” 
This principle likewise applies to many other rights. No 
plausible formal criterion distinguishes speech rights. 
On another reading, the judgments came out as they did 
because the Justices did not consider the history and logic of 
the corporate charters presented above. Silence is powerful 
evidence on this score. Neither Massachusetts nor Montana 
argued from its traditional authority to limit the activities of 
their own corporations.68 Neither Bellotti nor American 
Tradition Partnership explains why state authority in this 
domain, once thought to be absolute, no longer holds sway.69 
Indeed, neither decision so much as mentions the distinctive 
questions at stake when a state restricts its own 
corporations’ activities. To call the omission surprising would 
understate the magnitude of departure from past practice. If 
 
68 See, e.g., Bullock, 132 S. Ct. at 2491 (“Montana's arguments in 
support of the judgment below either were already rejected in Citizens 
United, or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.”). 
69 Jill Fisch has defended the majority’s decision on the ground that 
the Massachusetts statute “was a campaign finance law, not a part of the 
state corporation law.” Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein’s Monster Hits the 
Campaign Trail: An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political 
Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 598 (1991). As such, the statute 
purported to regulate all corporations doing business in the 
Commonwealth, not merely those corporations Massachusetts itself had 
constituted. Two of the respondents in Bellotti were in fact federally 
chartered banks. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) 
explains why Massachusetts would lack authority to disable them. On at 
least one view of severability, Fisch offers a clever and plausible 
rationalization. The Court did not itself reason along these lines, however. 
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Bellotti and American Tradition Partnership were but two of 
many decisions ignoring the states’ historical chartering 
authority, one might suppose the longstanding law of 
corporate powers had been abrogated sub silentio, replaced 
by some as-yet unarticulated theory of the corporation. But 
there is no such trend. As previously mentioned, the Court in 
Hobby Lobby, decided two years after American Tradition 
Partnership, once again appeared to return to the traditional 
conception of corporate power. 
Can anything be said in defense of Bellotti and American 
Tradition Partnership? None of the Justices’ opinions offers a 
reason to disregard the states’ traditional authority over 
domestic corporations. That said, a potential justification is 
found in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. In its 
familiar form, this doctrine holds that “government may not 
grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary 
surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may 
withhold that benefit altogether.”70 The state need not 
license you to drive, but it cannot condition your license on 
your agreeing to quarter troops in the home. Likewise, the 
argument would go, permission to act through the corporate 
form is a privilege the states can withhold altogether; but it 
must not be defined so as to prevent would-be corporators 
from jointly accomplishing constitutionally protected acts. 
The nineteenth-century cases affording states carte blanche 
are explicable, on this view, because the Bill of Rights was 
not then understood to apply to the states at all. Any 
conditions were not unconstitutional conditions. Now that 
most of the Rights bind the states, they are bound not to 
trample them. 
 
70 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1413, 1415 (1989); see also, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional 
Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321, 321 (1935) 
(unconstitutional conditions describes “the theory that a condition 
attached by a state to a privilege is unconstitutional if it requires the 
relinquishment of a constitutional right”). 
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Whatever the logic’s intuitive appeal, however, the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, at least in its current 
form, should not be understood to curtail state authority over 
corporate powers. As a basic doctrinal matter, the sine qua 
non of an unconstitutional condition is a proposed swap. In 
return for a valuable consideration from the state, you agree 
to give up a valuable right you would otherwise enjoy against 
the state. No such bargain is implicated when a state 
constitutes corporations unable to, say, make political 
contributions. The state offers a privilege it needn’t offer—
the opportunity to act through the corporate form. In return 
it asks prospective promoters for a modest filing fee, not to 
relinquish a constitutionally enshrined right. The promoters 
are able to make political contributions in their own names, 
whether or not they accept the state’s “deal.” The deal at 
stake with incorporation is not a trade; it is a kind of implicit 
subsidy of cooperative, especially capital-intensive, industry. 
It thus does not fit comfortably within the framework of 
unconstitutional conditions. 
Even if the courts were otherwise inclined to extend the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, a practical problem 
would counsel them against it. The courts would need to 
prescribe local aggregation rules—rules to decide whether 
and how a corporation has invoked its rights. To be concrete, 
suppose Bellotti and American Tradition Partnership are 
right: the states cannot prohibit even their own corporations 
from making certain kinds of political expenditures. Who, 
then, is to decide whether a corporation wishes to make an 
expenditure? And on what basis? These questions do not 
arise when an individual wants to speak; her say-so is 
conclusive. But a collective entity’s decision—its will, so to 
speak—reveals itself only by reference to a voting rule or 
some other method of individual-preference aggregation.71 
 
71 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 6, at 107–09. That the rule 
selected to aggregate preferences can decide the aggregation’s outcome has 
been clear since Arrow published his impossibility theorem. See Kenneth 
J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 
328 (1950). 
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These rules are the heart of all corporation codes. Indeed, 
corporate law is little more than a set of aggregation rules 
tailored, for better or worse, to discrete issues frequently 
arising in the life of a business firm. Many corporate acts are 
accomplished without shareholder say; some are conditioned 
on a majority of votes (with varying denominators); others on 
supermajorities. Broadly speaking, the aggregation rules are 
calibrated to the risks of free-riding, hold-up, or other 
exploitation associated with the context. In this sense, the 
architecture of “corporate democracy,” which Bellotti and 
Citizens United themselves endorse,72 is not dissimilar to 
that of American democracy. Plainly, aggregation rules 
requiring a high threshold of consent generate relatively 
little of the activity at issue, and more activity is generated 
where the aggregation rule requires little support. 
The status quo default rule in most states permits firm 
management to direct political expenditures without special 
shareholder authorization.73 But the status quo is not 
obligatory. The Court itself has emphasized state law’s 
important role in resolving conflicts over speech and religion 
that might arise within the firm.74 Indeed, since Citizens 
United, at least one state has made corporate speech more 
 
72 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 
(2010) (“the procedures of corporate democracy” will protect shareholders); 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794. 
73 James Kwak, supra note 6, at 253 (“[D]ecisions to support 
particular political organizations and causes are generally made by 
company executives, occasionally with oversight by the board of directors, 
but without meaningful input from shareholders.”). 
74 Such is the central argument of Pollman, supra note 6; see also 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362 (gesturing toward “the procedures of 
corporate democracy”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751, 2768 (2014) (explaining that “[s]tate corporate law provides a ready 
means for resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a 
corporation can establish its governing structure”). 
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difficult to produce.75 At the limit, the states could make the 
exercise of federal rights a practical impossibility.76  
Some commentators critical of Citizens United are 
resigned to concede that a state could not condition its 
corporations’ political-speech expenditures on unanimous 
shareholder approval.77 But their reasoning is unclear. 
Unanimous consent is an uncommon default rule in today’s 
corporation codes, for obvious reasons. But it is plainly a 
plausible rule because it forms the basis of ordinary contract 
and property law. Indeed, Bellotti itself suggested that state 
law could be used to make corporate political speech unlikely 
by requiring directors to account for waste.78 If there is a 
coherent ground under the First Amendment to preclude a 
state from disabling its corporations from making a given 
expenditure while allowing the state to impose monetary 
liability on directors for the very same expenditure, it is not 
obvious. Surely the Justices would prefer to hew to 
traditional theories of the state-corporation relationship and 
in so doing avoid the need to draw arbitrary lines about just 
what kind of aggregation rules are permissible in the context 
of political expenditures. 
 
75 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 6, at 101 n.54 (observing that 
Iowa now requires approval of a majority of board members). 
76 This possibility was first suggested in Victor Brudney, Business 
Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 
YALE L.J. 235 (1981). 
77 Kwak, supra note 6, at 292 (doubting the constitutionality of a 
voting rule “that makes it extremely difficult for a corporation to engage in 
political speech”); Bebchuk & Jackson, Jr., supra note 6, at 107–10 
(expressing skepticism about the constitutionality of rules appearing to 
make corporate speech difficult). But see Brudney, supra note 76, at 241–
43 (arguing the constitutionality of law withdrawing authority over 
political expenditures from board). 
78 See 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978). Whether this obiter comment can be 
reconciled in any meaningful sense with the holding is uncertain. 
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III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE  
POWERS 
If the argument in Part II is correct, the states can curtail 
the powers of corporations they charter as they see fit, 
including powers to do acts immunized by federal rights. 
This creates a puzzle. The recent corporate-rights cases have 
met stout public disapproval—Citizens United in 
particular—yet no state has moved to disempower its 
corporations. Why not? One possibility is that the average 
legislator thinks cases such as Citizens United and Hobby 
Lobby were sensibly decided. This might be true—it is 
unlikely—but in any event it is uninteresting. Another 
possibility is that legislators do not know their own 
legislative authority. If so, maybe they will soon discover it. 
A more intriguing explanation hinges on political economy. 
On reasonable assumptions about legislative behavior, states 
will vest their domestic corporations with powers in excess of 
those that the median legislator thinks sensible for the 
economy as a whole. Because entrepreneurs value, and so 
will be willing to pay for, freedom from government 
intervention, there is a market for corporate powers. Because 
each state expects its corporations to use their rights in part 
to resist regulation in other jurisdictions, legislatures will 
tend to underweight the social costs associated with 
corporate powers. This is the problem of territorial 
externalization. 
This Part explores the political economy of corporate 
powers. Section III.A examines the standard assumption 
that managers are willing to pay for, and so will make 
marginal decisions about reincorporation on the basis of, 
broad corporate powers. Sections III.B and III.C consider the 
political economy of rules under which corporate powers are 
determined by chartering and host states, respectively. Part 
III.D argues for the desirability of overlapping authority. 
Where a particular corporate power carries with it the 
prospect of significant territorial externalities, a sensible 
legal regime would allocate to host states the authority to 
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countermand the power, one way or another, subject to the 
restriction that they not discriminate in favor of local firms. 
A. The Corporate Powers Market: Will Entrepreneurs 
Pay to Retain Corporate Powers? 
Most discussions of the political economy of corporate 
chartering start with the assumption that entrepreneurs 
want a firm capable of doing more rather than less.79 The 
broader a corporation’s powers, the more options its 
managers have. The power to exercise a constitutional right 
is just a species of the more general phenomenon. More 
specifically, the power to exercise a corporate right can be 
understood as an option to ignore otherwise binding 
regulation. If a manager is satisfied with a particular 
regulation, she need not object. She objects only to onerous 
regulation. Consequently, one might think corporations will 
prefer the power to exercise more rather than fewer rights. 
But although this assumption might be right at first 
approximation, it is worth pausing to consider its realism in 
the rights context. Not all optionality has positive value. 
Those who associate with or through the corporate form 
often do so precisely because the corporation’s options are 
limited. Take, for example, run-of-the-mill contract law. In a 
static world, a corporate manager would prefer to be able to 
welch on existing deals at her option. But in the real, 
dynamic world, where investors make decisions according to 
their expectations of future performance, a corporate 
 
79 See generally, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (proposing a “race for 
the bottom” in corporate law driven by legislative acquiescence in 
managerial preferences); Donald E. Schwartz, Federal Chartering of 
Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 71 (1972) (arguing that federal 
chartering is advisable because state legislatures have incentive to cater to 
managers’ preferences for wide latitude); see also Louis K. Liggett Co. v. 
Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 554–64 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part) 
(describing historical development of corporate powers as function of 
managerial preferences and resulting economic pressure on state 
legislatures). 
BUCCOLA – FINAL  
No. 3:595] STATES’ RIGHTS AGAINST CORPORATE RIGHTS 625 
 
manager usually prefers to be bound.80 Hence, corporations 
possess the power to be sued. 
Against this background, consider the right to spend 
corporate funds on political speech that was at stake in 
Citizens United. The corporate law of most states allows 
managers to spend firm money on political ends as they see 
fit, subject only to ordinary fiduciary obligations.81 The 
question is: can one expect corporations to pay to retain the 
power to exercise the right? Much of the naïve criticism of 
Citizens United assumes, at least implicitly, that the answer 
is yes. Citizens United allows corporations to trade money for 
political considerations in a relatively direct fashion. 
Traditional lobbying entails significant deadweight losses, 
and presumably corporations would be ready to pay for the 
ability to buy favorable policy more cheaply. 
But firms might want not to have political-speech rights 
for two kinds of reasons. One relates to conflicts of interest 
within the firm, and indeed this rationale is oft cited as a 
justification for prohibitions on corporate political speech.82 
Some constituents of the corporation may worry about 
managers’ tendency to spend treasury funds on candidates 
they prefer personally, irrespective of the expected rewards 
to the corporation. Because managers will always be able to 
articulate a business purpose sufficient to withstand the 
challenge of a derivative suit, the corporate power becomes, 
in a real sense, a managerial power to spend “other people’s 
money.”83 A related problem arises when the corporation’s 
 
80 Whether this is so for any given firm depends quite obviously on 
context. Consider the trend toward mandatory arbitration in any number 
of domains. 
81 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 6, at 87. 
82 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political 
Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1103, 1113–23 (2002) (cataloging related objections along this line). 
83 Adam Winkler, Other People’s Money: Corporations, Agency Costs, 
and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871 (2004) (arguing that the 
first campaign-finance laws were, as an historical matter, enacted to 
ameliorate manager-shareholder conflicts of interest); see also Brudney, 
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constituents disagree about the political message the firm 
should send. This is not, narrowly speaking, an agency 
problem, because the supposed “principals” lack a unified 
interest. Rather, it reflects the reality that corporate 
constituents are not merely constituents, but real people 
with political views as well as interests in other investments 
that may conflict with the firm’s financial interests. In either 
case, the prospect that managers might choose to spend 
corporate funds on disfavored candidates is a cost 
prospective shareholders (and other constituents) 
realistically face, and they can be expected to charge for it in 
the price of the capital or other inputs they provide. If they 
charge more than the benefits a manager perceives, then 
presumably the manager will not value, or will even 
disvalue, the corporate right. Prohibition of political 
expenditures by charter or bylaw would seem the 
appropriate remedy.84 To be sure, many commentators doubt 
the efficacy of market constraints on managerial action. That 
old debate is not worth joining here. What is important to 
see is simply that, in some real-world situations, some 
corporations will act as though an ostensibly valuable power 
has zero or negative value. 
Alternatively, firms might disvalue the power to engage 
in political speech because of the threat of exploitation by 
politicians.85 To the extent the power to spend in furtherance 
of a candidate’s election is valuable to a corporation, it is 
because the candidate herself perceives the spending as 
useful—to herself. Put differently, according to the self-
interested model of corporate behavior, the power to make 
 
supra note 76, at 237–38 (arguing that agency conflict was among the 
motivations for early restrictions on political-speech expenditures). 
84 See Fisch, supra note 69, at 641–42. 
85 Sitkoff, supra note 82, at 1131–33; HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 76 (1995) (“All 
corporations might come out ahead if none participated in political 
activity. Yet individual firms cannot afford to refuse to participate in the 
game, because they may lose more wealth transfers to participating firms 
than they would save in rent-seeking costs.”). 
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direct expenditures is valuable precisely because direct 
expenditures represent a cheap method of funneling money 
to political candidates. But if this is so, then it cannot be long 
before candidates perceive the strength of their own 
bargaining position. Politicians are not mere passive objects 
of corporate rent-seeking. They may actively seek payment 
by explicit or implicit threat (promise) of regulatory 
retaliation (subsidy).86 Absent the power to spend corporate 
funds on political speech, politicians’ threats lose credibility 
on the margin. Thus, managers might in fact lobby not to be 
permitted to make political expenditures—at least if 
competitors are similarly disabled. But most of the salient 
constitutional rights do not seem to present an analogous 
dynamic. Few seem to generate collective-action problems 
among corporate actors. 
This analysis suggests a fault line. Corporations might 
not value the power to exercise corporate rights that 
generate high agency costs relative to the efficiency gains 
they make possible. Whether political-speech rights are of 
this type is an open question. Undoubtedly some of the quid 
pro quo associated with political expenditures might redound 
to managers in their personal capacity—a kind of disguised 
salary. But so, too, with the corporate power to donate funds 
to charity. Political speech does not obviously generate 
special agency problems not found elsewhere,87 and, on the 
other hand, firms may gain much by privileged access to 
policymakers. Whatever one thinks about political-speech 
rights, though, most constitutional rights would seem to 
generate relatively small agency costs. Think of the 
religious-exercise rights at issue in Hobby Lobby. Almost by 
 
86 Sitkoff, supra note 82, at 1126–27. This insight is often identified 
with Fred McChesney’s work. E.g., FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR 
NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997). 
87 Cf. Sitkoff, supra note 82, at 1105 (“There is nothing special about 
the agency problem associated with managerial control over corporate 
political speech that distinguishes it from any other area of managerial 
discretion.”). 
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definition, religious practices that affect business policy are 
open and notorious. Monitoring costs are accordingly small, 
and there are significant opportunities to generate surplus—
even if only because of idiosyncratic religious scruples. 
Ultimately, the question whether any given constitutional 
right is valuable to corporations must be judged on its own 
merits. But the standard assumption that all such rights are 
valuable is probably a fair one at first approximation. 
B. Chartering-State Incentives to Grant Socially 
Costly Powers 
If managers are willing to pay for the power to exercise 
federal rights, then the standard criticisms of the corporate-
charter market apply. It is old hat to observe that there is a 
market for corporate powers. Entrepreneurs value the 
opportunity to conduct business through the corporate form 
with minimum restrictions. State legislatures value the 
franchise taxes their corporations pay as well as the legal 
and administrative services domicile brings into the 
jurisdiction.88 The more freedom a legislature is willing to 
grant its corporations, the more revenue it can expect to 
generate. Indeed, commentators of varying stripes—both 
those who celebrate and those who decry the state-centered 
framework of American corporate law—have long invoked 
this very dynamic to explain the rise of enabling statutes in 
the late nineteenth century. Because entrepreneurs’ choice of 
a state of incorporation need not affect their business 
operations more than trivially, the story goes, states such as 
New Jersey and Delaware were able to enrich their 
treasuries by providing relatively robust corporate powers. 
 
88 For the classic elaboration of the relationship between franchise tax 
revenues and other state interests that could motivate corporate law 
legislation, see generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward 
an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 
(1987). 
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Other states tried vainly to keep hold of whatever franchise 
tax base they could.89 
The standard account is plausible enough as history, but 
it presents a puzzle in the context of corporate rights. In 
particular, the standard account suggests an equilibrium in 
which state corporate law supplies a roughly optimal 
package of corporate attributes. As we have observed, the 
negative-value corporate right is doubtless a special case. 
The baseline scenario is one in which entrepreneurs will be 
willing to pay for the power to exercise a given corporate 
right. But there is another side to the equation. 
Entrepreneurs will be willing to pay only so much as the 
right is worth to them. Likewise, it is clear enough that 
legislatures want tax revenue. But here, too, there is another 
side. Rights are apt to entail costs to the state, in the form of 
reduced regulatory efficacy. The easiest way to see this is to 
think of a putative corporate right not to pay income tax. 
Each dollar the firm avoids paying imposes a correlative cost 
on the rest of society. Other kinds of rights impose costs in a 
less obvious fashion by distorting otherwise binding legal 
relations thought to promote the general welfare, but 
notionally they work the same way. Legislators committed to 
their state’s welfare will therefore be willing to “sell” the 
power to exercise a corporate right only for a price 
outweighing the magnitude of the regulatory cost. The result 
seems to be that corporations will tend to be empowered to 
exercise socially valuable rights, but not socially costly ones. 
To see this concretely, consider a simplistic numerical 
example in which a single, wealth-maximizing corporation, 
C, bargains on Coasean terms for law with a single state, S, 
whose legislators seek to maximize the local welfare. 
Suppose C values at 20 the power to exercise the religious 
rights identified in Hobby Lobby. In other words, C will pay 
up to 20 for the option to ignore certain regulations on 
religious grounds. In addition, suppose S’s legislators 
 
89 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 554–64 (1933) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting in part). 
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estimate the cost of granting the power at 15. C’s invocation 
of a free-exercise right will frustrate regulation to some 
degree, legislators might think, but alternative legal 
responses could ameliorate any corresponding disruption of 
the economy. On these assumptions, S’s decision to grant the 
power results in a surplus of 5. Both C and S are better off in 
a world where C can make free-exercise claims. This is the 
uninteresting case where legislators think Hobby Lobby a 
sensible decision. Now suppose, instead, the legislators think 
the costs associated with a corporate free-exercise right are 
100. Perhaps the right is thought to create an end-run 
around important laws without any close, religiously 
unobjectionable substitute. To grant the right would cost S 
more, in lost regulatory efficacy, than it would yield C. The 
result is a regime in which C lacks power to exercise 
religious rights. 
To be sure, these examples are unrealistic along every 
dimension. Firms differ. Legislative preferences differ. There 
is no explicit bargaining process, and even if there were it 
would be plagued by holdup and free-rider problems. 
Nevertheless, the bargain paradigm can usefully develop 
intuitions about the way equilibria in real, diffuse markets 
can be expected to develop. The bargain paradigm suggests 
an equilibrium in which states would decline to grant 
corporations the power to exercise inefficient rights. If this 
were so, then one could expect state legislatures to bar their 
corporations from exercising the rights identified in Citizens 
United and Hobby Lobby if indeed legislators thought the 
rights net harmful. 
But the situation is not this simple, and the reason lies in 
the prospect of territorial externalization.90 A corporation’s 
powers are determined by the state that creates it. To this 
same state the corporation pays its franchise tax. But the 
corporation might do most of its business and—critically, for 
present purposes—exercise most of its rights elsewhere. 
 
90 For a systematic examination of this notion, see Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1485–95 (1992). 
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There is thus an opportunity for entrepreneurs and any one 
state jointly to push costs onto other states.91 Return to the 
religious-rights example. C values a free-exercise right at 20, 
and S’s legislators think the right would entail costs of 100. 
But now assume C operates nationwide. Only one-fiftieth of 
its operations are located in S. The 100 in regulatory costs 
are divided across the country. In expectation, S will bear 
only 2 of the 100. From the perspective of the country as a 
whole, the right is socially costly. From the perspective of S 
and C only, however, the right is socially valuable. 
The dynamic recalls the rhetoric of the “race to the 
bottom” in corporate law. In its classic formulation, the race 
turns on the divergent interests of shareholders and 
managers.92 States seeking franchise tax revenues will cater 
to managerial interests at the expense of investor interests 
because managers and not investors decide where to 
incorporate.93 The standard rejoinder argues that proponents 
of the “race to the bottom” err by focusing on a single 
market—the market for incorporation. Managers operate as 
well in product and capital markets such that the increased 
capital costs associated with inefficient rules will discipline 
managers’ desire for pro-management rules.94 Managers 
should tend to seek efficient rather than pro-management 
rules.95 Whatever one thinks of the empirical validity of the 
“race to the top” in the context of rules governing investor-
manager relations, there is no corresponding “upward” 
pressure in the context of corporate rights. The drive toward 
 
91 See id. at 1494. 
92 See Cary, supra note 79, at 663. 
93 Id. 
94 Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 251 (1977). 
95 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305 (1976) (on bonding); Winter, supra note 94; Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection 
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984); Romano, supra note 15 (on race to 
the top). 
BUCCOLA – FINAL  
632 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
efficient rules follows from the discipline of markets other 
than the corporate-charter market. That is, the “race to the 
top” depends on voluntary transactions—capital investments 
and consumer purchases—mediated by a price mechanism. 
In robust markets, inefficient rules mean smaller surpluses. 
No analog exists in the market for corporate rights. 
Managers and investors of every stripe have in common an 
interest in securing corporate powers that do not entail 
especially high agency costs. Thus, any state that 
unilaterally disables its own domestic corporations puts 
itself at a competitive disadvantage in the market for state 
charters.96 
C. Host-State Incentives to Curtail Socially Beneficial 
Powers 
If the incentive to grant socially costly corporate powers 
turns on territorial externalization, a sensible legal system 
might allow states to protect their own territory by, one way 
or another, “disabling” foreign corporations that do business 
locally. Indeed, an alternative corner solution would give 
each state the authority to decide the scope of foreign 
corporations’ powers on a territorial basis. On this model, if a 
corporation does business in State H sufficient to ground 
legislative jurisdiction, then H would have free rein to set 
the terms of the corporation’s powers. In effect, H would 
enjoy a veto over local corporate activity, to be exercised if 
the local costs of the activity’s externalities exceed its local 
benefits. 
This approach has clear appeal. Because franchise taxes 
are paid to the chartering state, H unlike S lacks a 
mechanism to support a direct quid pro quo exchange. In any 
event, H cannot collude to externalize the costs of corporate 
 
96 Sitkoff, supra note 82, at 1125–26, 1139 n.146; see, e.g., Bebchuk, 
supra note 90, at 1486; Stanley A. Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local 
Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433, 435–36 (1968) (arguing that the 
ubiquity of permissive corporation statutes is attributable to the outside 
option supplied by Delaware). 
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power outside its territory because it cannot dictate terms in 
other host states. H therefore lacks an incentive to grant 
socially excessive powers to foreign corporations. 
But host states have their own perverse incentives. They 
might tend to restrict the powers of foreign corporations too 
narrowly. Straightforward protectionism is the most obvious 
culprit. If a domestic corporation can do things foreign 
corporations cannot, the domestic corporation has a 
competitive advantage. To be sure, there are costs associated 
with excluding foreign corporations or otherwise putting 
them at a competitive disadvantage. The local activity of 
foreign corporations increases demand for host-state labor 
and services and, by encouraging competition, reduces price 
levels. These effects, in turn, generate income tax and sales 
tax revenues for the host state’s treasury. But these are 
standard arguments for free trade. Protectionist policy 
thrives nonetheless, often because of concentrated interests 
that can effectively organize a lobby.97 
Host states might discriminate against foreign 
corporations for another reason. On the margin, rules 
favoring domestic corporations will induce foreign 
corporations to migrate to the host state. A host state might 
not be able to oust foreign firms from the jurisdiction 
entirely, but by defining foreign corporations’ powers 
narrowly it could destroy the benefits they derive from 
incorporating elsewhere. Whether or not the market for 
corporate charters yields net benefits for the national 
economy as a whole, some economically powerful states, such 
as California, could rationally prefer to undermine it. 
D. A Non-Discrimination Norm 
Neither corner solution to the problem of allocating 
corporate powers is obviously dominant. The chartering state 
has reason to furnish what might be socially costly powers. 
 
97 MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
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Host states, for reasons familiar to students of public choice, 
might tend to restrict socially beneficial powers. Although 
the analysis here is too cursory to generate conclusive 
prescriptions, it suggests that a more refined allocation of 
regulatory authority could be optimal. A plausible candidate 
is a rule permitting host states to circumscribe at least some 
foreign corporation powers, but only on equal terms with 
domestic corporations. 
Two intuitions are important here. First, with respect to 
corporate attributes that are unlikely to generate significant 
territorial externalities, the chartering state is in good 
position to dictate terms. If a chartering state is likely to 
internalize most of the costs and benefits of a rule, there is 
no reason to risk undermining the charter market by 
allowing host states to dictate inconsistent terms. This is an 
important general consideration, but it has limited 
application in the context of constitutional rights. At their 
core, these rights signify the ability to resist territory-specific 
regulation. Second, to the extent host states are able to cabin 
corporate powers, the authority should be limited by a non-
discrimination principle. Protectionist impulses are not the 
only problem associated with host states’ setting the 
parameters of corporate activity, but they are the most 
important and are relatively easy to detect. 
IV. THE STATES AND FOREIGN CORPORATION 
POWERS 
This Part argues that a plausible reading of current 
doctrine is consistent with the political economy analysis 
offered in Part III. Chartering and host states have 
overlapping authority to curtail the exercise of corporate 
rights. In particular, each has an effective veto over their 
exercise, subject to the proviso that a host state may not 
exercise its veto in a discriminatory fashion. This is not to 
say host states have formal authority to revoke powers 
granted in a corporation’s charter. Corporate powers are 
granted by the chartering state, and corporate rights are 
secured by the Constitution. 
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But host states have other means of achieving their ends. 
Broadly speaking, there are two practical approaches a host 
state could adopt to restrain foreign corporations from doing 
acts protected by federal right. It must be said that neither 
approach is obviously constitutional. At the same time, 
however, both have pedigree and are at least plausible under 
existing law. Part IV.A outlines an approach whereby the 
host state seeks to regulate corporate decision processes 
ordinarily subject to the internal-affairs doctrine. Part IV.B 
considers a strategy whereby the host state seeks to induce 
compliance with its preferred policy by threatening non-
recognition. 
A. Regulation of Foreign Corporations’ Decision Rules 
Under one approach, a host state would assert direct 
authority, in a limited sphere, over the decision rules that 
generate corporate activity. By imposing rules that make the 
assertion of a right unlikely, the host state would indirectly 
reduce the use of federal rights by foreign corporations. The 
effect of this approach would not be to deprive the 
corporation of its powers or rights as a formal matter, but to 
make the exercise of the right highly unlikely. Laws 
reflecting this approach could take many forms. By way of 
example, a state law, applicable to all corporations doing 
business there, might make directors liable to the 
corporation for asserting its religious free-exercise rights 
absent supermajority approval by shareholders and 
employees. The states are generally supposed to have 
authority to define the rights and obligations of persons 
sufficiently “present” in their territory. The question is 
whether any doctrine specific to the context of federal 
corporate rights is inconsistent with the general rule. 
The most significant objection to this approach is found in 
the internal-affairs doctrine, a longstanding choice-of-law 
rule that assigns to the chartering state the authority to 
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regulate rights and obligations “inside” the corporation.98 
The doctrine’s subjects include, for example, the role of 
shareholders in directing management and the liability of 
directors and officers to the corporation.99 Rules governing 
corporate decision-making and establishing liabilities among 
persons associated in the corporation are thus quintessential 
examples of rules usually assigned to the state of 
incorporation. 
The internal-affairs doctrine has much to commend it. It 
is the foundation of jurisdictional competition, which at least 
arguably redounds to the public good.100 It provides a stable, 
predictable rule in a domain that might otherwise be marked 
by multiple, inconsistent regimes and cycling.101 Whatever 
 
98 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. a 
(AM. LAW INST. 1971) (defining internal affairs as “the relations inter se of 
the corporation, its shareholders, directors, officers or agents”). For 
examination of the doctrine’s historical roots, see generally Vincent S.J. 
Buccola, Corporate Law’s Domain (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author); Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal 
Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33 (2006). 
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304 (shareholder 
participation), § 309 (director and officer liability) (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
100 See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 15, at 1–13 (explaining that 
jurisdictional competition arises from the lack of necessary connection 
between a firm’s physical presence and its chartering state); David A. 
Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 521 (1994) (describing the internal 
affairs doctrine as a “crucial” component of state competition); Easterbrook 
& Fischel, supra note 95, at 697 (noting that competition can flourish only 
if entrepreneurs can choose which state provides rules for internal 
governance). 
101 See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for 
Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 175–76 (1985) 
(arguing that some uniform choice-of-law rule is needed to prevent 
incoherence, as when two states require mutually exclusive voting rules). 
Strictly speaking, incoherence is not a problem. The validity of any single 
transaction can usually be determined conclusively by the first court to 
render a judgment on the matter. That said, the law sensibly tends to 
prefer stable rules, even arbitrary ones, over the prospect of cycling. See 
generally Saul Levmore, Public Choice and Law’s Either/Or Inclination, 
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1663 (2012). 
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its merits, the doctrine is widely accepted. Yet 
notwithstanding their general acquiescence to the internal-
affairs doctrine, the states have never embraced it fully and 
universally. Since the late-nineteenth century, when New 
York sought to stymie the New Jersey incorporation mill, 
some states have declined to respect the doctrine’s full 
application.102 The most prominent examples today are 
California and New York. With their so-called “outreach” 
statutes, these states seek to regulate some or all of the 
internal affairs of foreign corporations having especially 
close local ties.103 California’s outreach statute applies to 
foreign corporations having at least half of their operations 
in-state and at least half of whose shares are owned by 
Californians.104 For these corporations, according to the 
statute, California corporate law displaces the law of the 
chartering state with respect to a wide range of “internal” 
issues, including director elections, directors’ standard of 
care, director liability and indemnification, shareholder 
inspection rights, and other things that run the whole gamut 
of corporate law.105 New York’s outreach statute is less 
dramatic in scope, but applies at a less exacting threshold.106 
Whatever functional merits one might perceive in the 
internal-affairs rule, the relevant doctrinal question for 
present purposes concerns only its legal source. If the 
internal-affairs doctrine is constitutional in nature, then 
outreach statutes are invalid and host states cannot, by 
prescribing aggregation rules, discourage foreign 
 
102 See Tung, supra note 98 at 92–96. 
103 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2014); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW 
§§ 1317–20 (McKinney 2003). Exceptions to the states’ general 
acquiescence in the internal affairs doctrine were noted at least 60 years 
ago. Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955). 
104 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a) (West 2014). 
105 Id. § 2115(b). 
106 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1317, 1320 (McKinney 2003) (applying 
select provisions of New York law to foreign corporations, not traded on a 
national securities exchange, that derive more than half their income from 
operations in New York). 
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corporations’ exercise of federal rights. If, on the other hand, 
the doctrine is merely a default rule applied by judges as a 
matter of comity, then states are free to abrogate what they 
dislike in it, as California and New York do, and impose 
their own law on foreign corporations within their legislative 
jurisdiction. 
Unfortunately, the internal-affairs doctrine’s legal source 
is uncertain.107 Respectable judges and scholars line up on 
both sides of the matter. California courts seem to think that 
the doctrine lacks constitutional pedigree, that it is a matter 
of common judicial practice only.108 Indeed, a version of this 
view is needed to justify the “outreach” statutes, and most 
scholars who have opined on the doctrine’s source agree with 
the California courts.109 As a matter of historical fact, the 
internal-affairs doctrine took hold in the postbellum courts 
without reference to the Constitution.110 If history is to be 
 
107 See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 124 
(2009) (“The Supreme Court has not spoken definitively on whether the 
courts in the United States are constitutionally compelled to apply the 
IAD.”); Jack B. Jacobs, The Reach of State Corporate Law Beyond State 
Borders: Reflections Upon Federalism, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1165–66 
(2009) (“The question [of the internal affairs doctrine’s constitutional 
status] is debatable, and legal commentators have lined up on both sides of 
the debate.”). 
108 Wilson v. Louisiana-Pac. Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 857–58 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982); W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719, 728 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961). But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 56, 63, 67–69 & n.3 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(applying the internal affairs doctrine).  
109 O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 107, at 126 (“[T]he U.S. 
Constitution probably does not forbid a state from regulating the internal 
governance of a firm that is incorporated elsewhere . . . .”); Norwood P. 
Beveridge, Jr., The Internal Affairs Doctrine: The Proper Law of a 
Corporation, 44 BUS. LAW. 693, 702–15 (1989); Richard M. Buxbaum, The 
Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in 
Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29 (1987); P. John Kozyris, Corporate 
Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 33–46 (arguing that forum 
state may apply its own corporate law, at least if foreign corporation’s 
contacts predominate); Latty, supra note 103. 
110 See Buccola, supra note 98 (describing the doctrine’s emergence 
beginning in the 1860s); Tung, supra note 98, at 74 (“Th[e] reluctance to 
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squared with a constitutional conception of internal affairs, a 
“look-through” theory of some type is needed. Nevertheless, 
some observers ground the internal-affairs doctrine in 
constitutional text, specifically the commerce and the full 
faith and credit clauses.111 Delaware courts have made clear 
their view that the Constitution prescribes the doctrine, but 
are less clear about why.112 As recently as 2005, the 
Delaware Supreme Court declared that the internal-affairs 
doctrine was mandated both by the negative commerce 
clause and by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
clause.113 The Court of Chancery found another source of 
authority in the full faith and credit clause.114 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in cases involving internal 
affairs leave room for interpretation. Some cases seem to 
 
regulate foreign corporations’ internal affairs was more or less a calculated 
response to economic conditions—especially the changing industrial 
organization brought about by technological innovation—and not as a 
result of constitutional mandate.”). 
111 See Harold W. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on 
State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1971) (dormant 
commerce clause); Willis L.M. Reese & Edmund M. Kaufman, The Law 
Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith 
and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1958) (full faith and credit clause). 
112 VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 
1108, 1116 (Del. 2005) (“Accordingly, we hold Delaware's well-established 
choice of law rules and the federal constitution mandated that Examen's 
internal affairs, and in particular, VantagePoint's voting rights, be 
adjudicated exclusively in accordance with the law of its state of 
incorporation, in this case, the law of Delaware.”); Draper v. Paul N. 
Gardner Defined Plan Trust, 625 A.2d 859, 867, 869 (Del. 1993) (observing 
that internal affairs doctrine has constitutional underpinnings); 
McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 (Del. 1987) (“[W]e conclude 
that application of the internal affairs doctrine is mandated by 
constitutional principles, except in ‘the rarest situations.’”); see also 
Jacobs, supra note 107, at 1161–64 (describing the conflict between 
Delaware and California courts). 
113 See Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d at 1113. 
114 See Rosenmiller v. Bordes, 607 A.2d 465, 468 (Del. Ch. 1991) 
(explaining that the internal-affairs doctrine “implicates federal due 
process, commerce clause and full faith and credit clause considerations”). 
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suggest the internal-affairs doctrine is constitutionally 
demanded. Others seem to endorse legislative schemes 
inconsistent with its premise.115 Some older precedents tend 
to support a “constitutional” theory under the full faith and 
credit clause. A telling example is Broderick v. Rosner, which 
considered whether a state court could apply its own law to 
resolve the obligations of local stockholders in a foreign 
bank.116 New York’s banking law provided that stockholders 
could be assessed to pay the bank’s debts ratably, up to the 
par value of their stock.117 Broderick, New York’s 
Superintendent of Banks, brought an assessment action 
under this law in New Jersey against stockholders of a New 
York bank. The defendants sought refuge in New Jersey law, 
which prohibited the state’s courts from entering judgment 
against stockholders for corporate debts.118 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court held that New York law should prevail.119 
The Court explained, “[t]he nature of the cause of action 
br[ought] it within the scope of the full faith and credit 
clause.”120 As the Justices saw it, the subject matter of the 
complaint was so “peculiarly within the regulatory power 
of . . . the State of incorporation” that “no other State 
properly can be said to have any public policy thereon.”121 
Broderick seems like an endorsement of the view that a 
chartering state’s law trumps all inconsistent law with 
respect to internal disputes, or at least stockholder 
 
115 See, e.g., Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144 (1901) (holding that 
California law concerning stockholder liability could be applied in case of 
Colorado mining corporation doing business in California); Thomas v. 
Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221 (1914) (same result for Arizona corporation 
doing substantially all of its business in California). 
116 294 U.S. 629 (1935). 
117 Id. at 637. 
118 Id. at 638. 
119 Id. at 642–44. 
120 Id. at 643. 
121 Id. (quoting Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S 243, 260 (1912)). 
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assessment cases.122 If the Court’s choice-of-law 
jurisprudence today otherwise resembled that of the 1930s, 
Broderick and other cases like it might be conclusive.123 But 
it does not. The Court’s use of the full faith and credit clause 
to constrain choice of law has declined markedly since then. 
According to one analysis, the Court has invalidated the 
application of a forum state’s law only once since the 
1970s.124 The modern trend is to allow a state court to apply 
domestic law so long as the forum state has at least a 
plausible connection to the dispute. 
The other potential constitutional basis for the internal-
affairs doctrine is the negative commerce clause.125 Although 
the commerce clause is phrased as a grant of legislative 
authority to Congress,126 the Court has long understood it to 
bar state laws that discriminate against, or otherwise bear 
sufficiently baleful consequences on, out-of-state 
businesses.127 A statute abrogating part of the internal-
affairs doctrine would not be discriminatory; on the contrary, 
its aim would be to impose uniform decision rules on all 
corporations, wherever incorporated, doing business in the 
host state. The relevant question for our purposes is whether 
such a law would discourage interstate commerce to a degree 
local interests cannot justify. It could do so, one might think, 
by subjecting corporate activity to multiple, inconsistent 
 
122 See also Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 
531, 546 (1915); Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 
(1925). 
123 Compare Reese & Kaufman, supra note 111 (arguing that full faith 
and credit clause should be read to mandate internal affairs doctrine), 
with O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 107, at 126 (concluding that best 
interpretation of modern choice-of-law doctrine suggests internal affairs 
doctrine is not constitutional). 
124 O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 107, at 125. 
125 For more on this possibility, see Horowitz, supra note 111. 
126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
127 See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: 
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 
(1986). 
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mandates.128 If any state in which a corporation does 
minimal business, or in which some of its shareholders 
reside, may regulate their joint relations, the result is a 
possible mess, the threat of which might discourage 
interstate commerce. 
The Supreme Court has never directly articulated the 
view that the commerce clause mandates the internal-affairs 
doctrine. As others have noted, though, the idea finds some 
support in the juxtaposition of two cases, decided five years 
apart, on the constitutionality of anti-takeover statutes.129 
Edgar v. MITE Corp. concerned the enforceability of an 
Illinois outreach statute.130 The statute sought to regulate 
tender offers for the stock of any corporation, whether or not 
domestically chartered, with certain connections to the state. 
Before launching a tender offer for the stock of a covered 
corporation, a would-be acquirer was obliged to register its 
offer with the Secretary of State. The Secretary, in turn, was 
empowered to block the offer if, among other reasons, he 
determined the terms “inequitable.”131 MITE, a Delaware 
corporation with its principal place of business in 
Connecticut, initiated a tender offer for the stock of an 
Illinois company.132 MITE complied with the Williams Act, 
but not the Illinois law, and sought an injunction against its 
enforcement. The Supreme Court sided with MITE, 
invalidating the Illinois law on commerce clause grounds. As 
a majority of the Justices saw things, Illinois was seeking to 
 
128 Cf. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 (12 How.) U.S. 299, 319 (1851). 
129 For more thorough analyses of the constitutional significance of 
this pair of cases, see Arthur R. Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for 
Corporate Control: State Takeover Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 699, 743–74 (1988); Paul N. Cox, The Constitutional 
“Dynamics” of the Internal Affairs Rule—A Comment on CTS Corporation, 
13 J. CORP. L. 317, 337–62 (1988); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) 
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 
1865–84 (1987). 
130 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
131 Id. at 627. 
132 Id. at 626–28. 
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block trades among persons with no connection to the 
State—a “direct” attempt to regulate interstate commerce.133 
Five years later, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of 
America, the Court again considered the enforceability of a 
state law seeking to deter hostile takeovers.134 The Indiana 
statute at issue in CTS Corp. differed from the Illinois 
statute in two important respects. First, Indiana 
accomplished its end by denying voting rights to shares 
acquired without the target’s permission, not, like Illinois, by 
claiming the license to block transactions in securities 
directly. Second, the Indiana law applied only to domestic 
corporations.135 This time the Court upheld the statute 
against a commerce clause challenge.136 A consequentialist 
will struggle to see why. For covered corporations, the two 
statutes produced more or less the same effect. Both reduced 
the viability of hostile tender offers, and both imposed most 
of the costs on out-of-state stockholders. Something other 
than the function was at play. 
Edgar and CTS Corp. can be reconciled in two ways, only 
one of which depends on a constitutional view of the 
internal-affairs doctrine. The first possibility is that the 
internal-affairs doctrine was decisive. Illinois sought to deter 
transactions in the stock of foreign as well as domestic 
corporations (not okay); Indiana sought to deter transactions 
in the stock of domestic corporations only (okay). Some of the 
rather meandering discussion in CTS Corp. supports this 
view—namely, that the negative commerce clause implies 
the internal-affairs doctrine because its absence would 
threaten incompatible dictates. But “[s]o long as each State 
regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has 
created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only 
one State.”137 Alternatively, the cases can be understood 
 
133 Id. at 643–44. 
134 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
135 Id. at 73–74.  
136 Id. at 94.  
137 Id. at 89. 
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simply to reaffirm a persistent disjunction in commerce 
clause cases between “direct” and “indirect” regulation of 
trade.138 Illinois sought to stop a person in one state from 
buying securities from persons in other states (not okay); 
Indiana sought to create conditions under which securities 
transactions would be unattractive (okay). This rationale too 
finds support in CTS Corp. The bottom line is that the 
constitutional status of the internal-affairs doctrine is 
arguable. 
B. Conditional Recognition of Foreign Corporations 
Under another approach, a host state would seek to 
restrict foreign corporations’ exercise of rights by 
conditioning recognition of the corporation on its not 
invoking its rights. The consequence of this strategy, if 
effective, would be to deprive foreign firms that exercise 
disfavored rights of their corporate character with respect to 
acts done and property held in the host state. It is well 
established that there are some grounds on which a state can 
refuse to “admit” foreign corporations or “eject” those it 
previously admitted. For example, every state requires that 
foreign corporations register their business and nominate a 
local representative on whom service of process may be 
effected. The relevant question, which this section pursues, 
is whether a state can decline to recognize foreign 
corporations on the ground that they choose to exercise a 
federally established right. Again here, existing law yields no 
straightforward answer. The courts could plausibly extend 
available constitutional doctrines to neuter this sort of 
strategy. On the other hand, legislators in an economically 
powerful state, such as California, could enact a robust non-
recognition law without blushing—at least if the state were 
also to disempower its own corporations on equal terms 
along the lines articulated in Part II. 
 
138 So concluded the Seventh Circuit. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. 
Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 506 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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The states’ authority not to recognize foreign-chartered 
corporations was first established in 1839, in Bank of 
Augusta v. Earle.139 The case presented a deceptively simple 
dispute over the enforceability of a contract made in 
Alabama between Earle, an Alabama citizen, and the bank, 
chartered by Georgia. Earle contended the deal was 
unenforceable by virtue of these facts alone. On his theory, 
Georgia corporations, being a product of that state’s 
sovereignty, could act validly in Georgia only.140 The bank, 
for its part, argued that it was constitutionally entitled to 
make contracts anywhere in the Union.141 Georgia had 
empowered the bank to buy bills of exchange domestically 
and abroad.142 According to the bank, because the bank’s 
members were citizens of one of the several states, the bank 
was entitled, derivatively, to the privileges and immunities 
of Alabama citizens.143 
The Court sided with the bank. The Court’s reasoning did 
not, however, turn on a supposed constitutional privilege to 
conduct business in Alabama. On the contrary, the Court 
disclaimed the view that Alabama was obliged to recognize 
the contract. Alabama could, if it wished, decline to give 
effect to the local acts of corporations chartered elsewhere. 
As the Court saw it, “[e]very power . . . which a corporation 
exercises in another state, depends for its validity upon the 
laws of the sovereignty in which it is exercised; and a 
corporation can make no valid contract without their 
sanction, express or implied.”144 The bank prevailed only 
because Alabama had not in fact announced a rule of non-
 
139 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). 
140 Id. at 588. 
141 Id. at 586. 
142 Id. at 588. 
143 Id. at 586; see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; Bank of U.S. v. 
Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 83 (5 Cranch.) (1809) (holding, for purposes of the 
diversity jurisdiction, that a corporation has the citizenship of its 
members).  
144 Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 589. 
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recognition. As a matter of comity, the acts of a corporation 
chartered in one state were to be deemed valid in another 
state absent the latter state’s contrary legislation. Bank of 
Augusta thus established two principles of enduring 
significance: first, as a matter of constitutional authority, a 
state can decline to recognize, as corporate in nature, the 
local acts of foreign corporations; second, as a matter of 
interpretation, courts will presume a state’s recognition.145 
An important corollary to the states’ non-recognition 
power was soon to emerge. If a state can refuse altogether to 
recognize foreign corporations, then, by the theory that the 
greater power implies the lesser, it follows that a state can 
also qualify recognition of foreign corporations on specified 
conditions. So, in any event, the Court held in a series of 
cases beginning in 1855. Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French 
concerned the enforceability of a judgment of the Ohio 
courts, against an Indiana corporation, on a contract made in 
Ohio.146 Ohio law allowed foreign insurers to do business in 
the state, but it conditioned their privilege on their agreeing 
to receive service of process on any agent who might be found 
in the jurisdiction.147 Consistent with the statute, French 
effected service on a Lafayette agent, in Ohio, and won a 
judgment. He then sought to enforce the judgment in 
Indiana, where Lafayette’s assets could be found. The 
question thus arose whether Ohio’s rule on service of process 
was sufficient to ground its courts’ jurisdiction and thereby 
oblige Indiana to give the judgment full faith and credit. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the Ohio courts’ jurisdiction was 
proper, on the theory that Lafayette had impliedly consented 
 
145 See Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 13 (1877) 
(asserting that comity is to be presumed absent explicit state action to the 
contrary); ANGELL & AMES, supra note 27, § 161 at 125 (“Every power 
which a corporation exercises in another State, depends for its validity 
upon the laws of the sovereignty in which it is exercised.”); id. § 374, at 
377 (“The legislature undoubtedly has power to prohibit foreign 
corporations from contracting in the State; but, until it does so, contracts 
so made will be enforced.”). 
146 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 406 (1855). 
147 Id. 
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to service on its agents.148 The company’s consent was to be 
found in its very decision to do business in Ohio. Ohio had 
announced a rule concerning service of process on foreign 
corporations. Lafayette chose to enter Ohio. Therefore, 
Lafayette must have agreed to Ohio’s terms. The deduction 
was sound, but only if Ohio had authority to exclude 
Lafayette absent its consent to the state’s terms. This is 
precisely what Lafayette Insurance signified. Recalling Bank 
of Augusta, Justice Curtis’s opinion for the Court began with 
the premise that “[a] corporation created by Indiana can 
transact business in Ohio only with the consent, express or 
implied, of the latter State.”149 To this consent Ohio could 
attach: 
such conditions as Ohio may think fit to impose; and 
these conditions must be deemed valid and effectual 
by other States, and by this court, provided they are 
not repugnant to the constitution or laws of the 
United States, or inconsistent with those rules of 
public law which secure the jurisdiction and 
authority of each State from encroachment by all 
others, or that principle of natural justice which 
forbids condemnation without opportunity for 
defence.150 
The proviso would in later years prove important, and it 
remains important today. But in the decades following 
Lafayette Insurance, the Court upheld any number of state 
laws conditioning recognition of foreign corporations. The 
states were held competent to require foreign corporations 
to, for example, file copies of their charter documents,151 
appoint local agents to receive service of process, post special 
bonds,152 and pay special taxes.153 The states were held 
 
148 Id. at 404. 
149 Id. at 407 (citing Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 
(1839)). 
150 Id. 
151 Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239 U.S. 560 (1916). 
152 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 181 (1869). 
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competent to exclude foreign corporations for failing to 
comply with these obligations, for removing suits to federal 
court,154 and for violating state antitrust laws, whether 
locally or abroad.155 In short, until the twentieth century, as 
one commentator remarked, “it was clearly the doctrine of 
the Supreme Court that a state might decline to admit a 
foreign corporation arbitrarily or even from a motive 
contrary to the general purposes of the Constitution.”156 
Non-recognition did not, and does not, imply the 
authority to confiscate corporate property, on the one hand, 
or to bar commerce with foreign citizens, on the other. Non-
recognition pierces the corporate fiction, casting the firm’s 
acts and property as the acts and property of individuals 
associated in partnership. As one court put it, a law 
disregarding foreign corporations “convert[s] the foreign 
corporators, as to the state enacting the supposed law, into a 
partnership of individuals.”157 The corporate form is 
valuable, and so therefore is the power to disregard it, but it 
is worth remembering that a firm can do business abroad 
whether or not it is recognized as a corporate body.158 
 
153 Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 410, 413 (1870). 
154 Doyle v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 542 (1876); see also Sec. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246, 258 (1906) (reaffirming the rule in 
Doyle). 
155 Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 343 (1909); 
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 28 (1900). 
156 GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 
IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY AND 
THEORY OF JURISTIC PERSONS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 110–11 (1918). 
157 Erie Ry. Co. v. New Jersey, 31 N.J.L. 531, 544 (N.J. 1864); see also 
Tung, supra note 98, at 99 n.334 (collecting cases in which the judicial 
decision not to recognize a foreign corporation was understood to imply the 
de facto substitution of a partnership). 
158 See, e.g., Flexnor v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289, 292 (1919) (holding that 
partnership operating in state with law authorizing service of process on 
agents, as in Lafayette Insurance, does not impliedly consent to such 
service, since “the State had no power to exclude the defendants,” and so 
the defendants did not impliedly consent to be bound by the prescribed 
service); see also Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 408–
09 (1855) (noting that implied consent theory applicable to foreign 
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The states’ plenary authority to qualify recognition of 
foreign corporations was not to last. To some extent the 
waning of the non-recognition power followed inevitably from 
the national economy’s rapid nationalization. Trade across 
state lines was becoming cheaper. Increasingly complex 
production and distribution networks made the corporate 
form increasingly valuable and led to a proportionate 
increase in the number and importance of firms engaged in 
interstate commerce. It was understood that the commerce 
clause prevented states from excluding corporations engaged 
in interstate commerce,159 and the functional significance of 
this limitation grew proportionally. Nationalization also 
implied growth in the amount of local trade that bore 
significant interstate consequences—importantly to be 
distinguished from “interstate commerce” in the narrow, 
constitutional sense of the phrase. Here lay an opportunity 
for states to use their non-recognition power to favor local 
interests and balkanize trade. Many states adopted 
differential tax schemes to expropriate surpluses generated 
by what was ultimately interstate trade. The Court 
responded by fashioning new exceptions to the states’ non-
recognition authority. 
The Justices have never questioned the general premise 
that states may exclude foreign corporations. Instead the 
Court began, over time, to fashion ad hoc exceptions to state 
authority under the banner of three constitutional headings: 
the negative commerce clause, the equal protection clause, 
and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. This is not the 
place to canvas these doctrines’ full implications. A 
contextual sketch of each must suffice. What matters for 
 
corporations might not hold as applied to foreign, natural persons, whom a 
state lacks absolute power to exclude). 
159 See Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877) 
(holding that a Florida law purporting to grant a monopoly on telegraph 
lines in the state, irrespective of congressional legislation on the subject, 
was void under the commerce clause); see also HENDERSON, supra note 
156, at 112–16. 
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present purposes is whether any of the three would bar a 
state law that conditions recognition of foreign corporations 
on their “agreement” not to invoke federal rights. As the 
Court has applied these doctrines in the non-recognition 
context, they share a theme—preventing states from 
adopting protectionist tactics. If this is so, states may well be 
able to condition recognition of foreign corporations on their 
non-exercise of certain federal rights. But they almost 
certainly cannot do so without also disabling their own 
domestic corporations in similar fashion. 
Commerce Clause. In its negative form, the commerce 
clause invalidates state laws that interfere unreasonably 
with interstate commerce. As early as the 1870s, this 
principle began to form a definite limit on the states’ 
authority to condition recognition of foreign corporations.160 
Two applications emerged.161 First, the states were held 
incompetent to exclude foreign corporations engaged solely 
in interstate commerce. The power to exclude, like the power 
to tax, would involve the power to destroy.162 If the states 
could not exclude such corporations absolutely, then nor 
could they exclude them conditionally. After all, the theory of 
implied consent articulated in Lafayette Insurance was 
premised on the notion that a state could, if it wished, 
exclude foreign corporations absolutely. Although this 
application of the commerce clause was important as far as it 
went, it had limited breadth. To the extent a corporation 
engaged in intrastate as well as interstate commerce, the 
states remained free to condition recognition.163 
Second, and more important for our purposes, the states 
were held incompetent to condition recognition of foreign 
corporations on account of discriminatory rules that might 
 
160 Pensacola Tel. Co., 96 U.S. at 1. 
161 See HENDERSON, supra note 156, at 110–17 (describing the early 
application of the commerce clause to the question of the states’ non-
recognition authority). 
162 Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819). 
163 E.g., Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239 U.S. 560, 567–68 
(1916). 
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indirectly burden interstate commerce. Most of the 
commerce clause cases in this vein concern discriminatory 
taxation.164 On the traditional theory, a host state could 
exact from foreign corporations any price it pleased—any 
tax—as a condition of the right to do business within the 
state. The commerce clause’s elaboration changed that. The 
principle underlying the dormant commerce clause implied 
that a state may not use its taxing power to discriminate 
against interstate commerce.165 How this principle would 
apply in concrete cases was not always clear, and the Court’s 
apportionment jurisprudence remains convoluted to this 
day.166 For our purposes, though, the general principle is 
enough. The courts will look askance at non-recognition 
rules, a consequence of which is to discourage the flow of 
goods or persons across state lines. Any time foreign firms 
are treated more harshly than domestic firms, a 
discrimination case is plausible. But if domestic and foreign 
corporations are treated alike, the case is much weaker. 
Equal Protection. In 1886, the Court held that 
corporations are “persons” within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause.167 
Applying as it does only to persons within a state’s 
jurisdiction,168 the clause has nothing to say about the 
conditions a state may place on foreign corporations’ entry. 
The equal protection principle does, however, limit states’ 
authority to enforce laws, including by ejection, against 
 
164 See HENDERSON, supra note 156, at 117. 
165 Id. at 118. 
166 Regan, supra note 127, at 1185 (“The Court has done much in 
recent years to clarify dormant commerce clause doctrine in the taxation 
area, but no one would claim it has completed the task of clarification.”). 
167 Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 397 (1886). For 
discussions of the historical and theoretical underpinnings of this 
important decision, see generally Ruth H. Bloch & Naomi Lamoreaux, 
Corporations and the Fourteenth Amendment (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The 
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985). 
168 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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foreign corporations that entered validly.169 The principle 
has been an important substitute for the commerce clause in 
two situations: (i) where a state’s non-recognition rule 
discriminates against out-of-state business, but not strictly 
against “interstate commerce,”170 and (ii) where legislation 
makes the negative commerce irrelevant.171 
The equal protection clause—even more clearly than the 
commerce clause—stands simply for a principle of non-
discrimination.172 As a matter of hornbook law, equal 
protection analysis first asks whether the state has a 
legitimate interest in the ends of its regulation, and, second, 
whether the means are rationally related to it. In particular, 
a state’s imposition of “more onerous taxes or other burdens 
on foreign corporations than . . . on domestic corporations” is 
invalid, notwithstanding the general non-recognition 
authority, unless “the discrimination between foreign and 
domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate state purpose.”173 Protecting local business at the 
expense of interstate competition is not a “legitimate state 
purpose.”174 Thus, equal protection effectively mandates like 
 
169 See Herndon v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 135, 158 
(1914) (holding that railway had become “person within the state” and 
hence could not be discriminated against without reason). 
170 See, e.g., Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 492–95 (1927) 
(invalidating Arkansas venue rule providing that suits against a domestic 
corporation be brought in a county in which the corporation does business, 
but permitting suit against foreign corporations in any county). 
171 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 874–83 (1985) 
(invalidating statute which taxed domestic insurers’ gross insurance 
premiums at a lower rate than foreign insurers’). This rule has been most 
important in the realm of state insurance regulation, which the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts from negative commerce clause scrutiny. See 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2012); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 654–55 (1981). 
172 Cf. Ward, 470 U.S. at 880–82 (noting counsel’s complaint that the 
Court used equal protection merely to instantiate commerce-clause values 
where the commerce clause would not apply). 
173 State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. at 667–68 (citing Power Mfg. 
Co., 274 U.S. at 493–94). 
174 Ward, 470 U.S. at 876–78. 
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treatment of foreign and domestic corporations in all but 
trivial matters. Under this principle, a state likely cannot 
require foreign corporations to forswear the exercise of 
federal rights while simultaneously permitting its own 
corporations to invoke them. But, if a state were willing to 
treat or disable its own corporations on similar terms, equal 
protection would not stand in the way. 
Unconstitutional Conditions. The biggest threat to the 
non-recognition strategy is found in the doctrine of 
“unconstitutional conditions.”175 This doctrine describes “the 
theory that a condition attached by a state to a privilege is 
unconstitutional if it requires the relinquishment of a 
constitutional right.”176 To recognize the corporate form is to 
grant a privilege. States may or may not grant the privilege 
as they see fit. However, they may not qualify it on an 
unconstitutional condition. The problem is obvious. Consider 
the rights of religious free exercise. Corporations empowered 
by their charters to practice religion have a constitutional 
right to do so. A state’s law conditioning recognition of 
foreign corporations on their agreement not to exercise 
religion thus seems in a straightforward sense to be a law 
conditioning a privilege on “the relinquishment of a 
constitutional right.” Some cases seem to support this 
deduction. States cannot, for example, condition the 
recognition of a foreign corporation on its waiver of the 
“constitutional right to resort to the federal courts,”177 
 
175 Frost v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593–94 (1926). For a history of 
the development of unconstitutional conditions theory in relation to the 
states’ non-recognition power, see HENDERSON, supra note 156, at 132–47. 
176 Hale, supra note 70, at 321. 
177 Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532–33 (1922) (“[T]he 
federal Constitution confers upon citizens of one state the right to resort to 
federal courts in another . . . .”). The Justices apparently had in mind a 
constitutional right not to be blocked from suing in whatever federal 
courts were presently vested with jurisdiction—a statutory rather than 
constitutional predicate. 
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payment of a tax on property held outside the state,178 or 
agreement to charge non-discriminatory prices.179 
Yet the doctrine’s application is unpredictable 
notwithstanding the apparently clean categories in which it 
is typically framed. In the context of the state’s non-
recognition authority, no safe bet is possible. As the Court 
itself has admitted, unconstitutional conditions cases in this 
domain have “produced results that seem inconsistent or 
illogical.”180 Nor could it be otherwise, for the doctrine 
contains within its very articulation a contradiction in terms. 
Consider, for example, the following rule: “A state may not 
say to a foreign corporation, you may do business within our 
borders if you permit your property to be taken without due 
process of law.”181 Few would object to what sounds like a 
reasonable principle.  But the rule hides a conceptual 
problem. As one commentator explained, “To ‘permit your 
property to be taken without due process’ is a contradiction 
in terms. Property taken by permission is not taken without 
due process.”182 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is really a 
doctrine of unreasonable conditions, with the judiciary cast 
as the arbiter of reason. The evidence is unmistakable. Take 
the trivial example of the driver’s license. Every state 
requires would-be drivers to pay a modest fee in addition to 
passing a battery of tests. How can this arrangement be 
constitutional? You have a right to the security of your 
property, and to compensation for its taking. “License for a 
fee” is an offer to give you a privilege on condition that you 
surrender a part of your property rights. If the terms in 
 
178 Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S. v. Pennsylvania, 238 
U.S. 143, 146 (1915) (“[A] state cannot tax property beyond its jurisdiction” 
and “cannot effect that result indirectly by making the payment a 
condition of the right to do local business . . . .”). 
179 Frost, 271 U.S. at 593–97. 
180 W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 
658 (1981). 
181 Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 83 (1913). 
182 HENDERSON, supra note 156, at 147. 
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which unconstitutional conditions is usually framed were 
taken literally, the arrangement could not stand. But of 
course it can stand. License fees are ubiquitous and 
constitutional. The illustration is useful only to see that the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is less straightforward 
than one might suppose. 
As the Justices have applied it in the non-recognition 
cases, unconstitutional conditions furthers the same goals as 
the commerce and equal protection theories do. That is, the 
Court invokes unconstitutional conditions mainly to 
invalidate discriminatory regimes.183 So, for example, a state 
may not condition recognition on a corporation’s agreement 
to “more onerous” taxes than an otherwise comparable 
domestic corporation must bear.184 To the extent domestic 
corporations are empowered to do acts the Constitution 
protects, a state may not entice foreign corporations to 
disclaim them. The level playing field is the key metaphor.185 
In sum, a state that disables its own corporations along a 
particular dimension has a strong claim to insisting that 
foreign corporations behave in a like manner—whether or 
not the conduct at issue implicates constitutional values. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article’s title is meant to evoke a unifying theme: the 
states’ ability in practice to abrogate the Supreme Court’s 
corporate-rights decisions. In broad strokes, the suggestion 
 
183 For an account casting the relevant case law as concerned 
primarily with “disguised differential taxation”—that is, discrimination, 
see Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: 
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 31–38 (1988). 
184 State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. at 667–68. 
185 See Epstein, supra note 183, at 31–32 (“The best way to combat 
this problem [of foreign corporations maneuvering to gain admission] is 
through a strong, categorical rule granting foreign corporations the same 
right to do business in another state on the same terms and conditions 
available to its local corporations.”). 
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of thematic unity is justified. Scholarly and popular 
commentators alike have largely assumed that federal law—
and more specifically the Court’s take on it—is the beginning 
and end of the story when it comes to corporate rights. If it 
accomplishes nothing else, this Article hopes to put the lie to 
that notion. State law supplies the terms that give 
constitutional corporate rights their purchase. Because state 
law is relatively easy to change, would-be reformers should 
focus their attention on it rather than far-fetched plans to 
amend the Constitution. The distinction here outlined 
between powers and rights is easy to overlook in an era of 
liberal corporate codes, but it is central to the legal theory of 
the firm, and we forget it at our peril. 
In another sense, though, the title conceals an important 
disjunction. The states tread on unequal footing with respect 
to any particular corporation’s scope of action. Nor can it be 
otherwise in a federal system where the national 
government charters only very few corporations. The 
chartering state has a stronger claim than others to restrict 
a corporation’s powers, precisely because the chartering state 
reaps benefits from a lax policy. If the chartering state is 
willing to forgo these benefits, there is a strong presumption 
that it does so for sound reasons. But host states, too, can 
claim authority to curtail disfavored corporate acts, and their 
claim finds substantial support both in political economy 
and, absent discrimination, in existing doctrine. 
 
